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# *The Department of State*

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Vol. XXXI, No. 791

August 23, 1954



## **COMMUNIST TACTICS IN THE FAR EAST • by**

*Assistant Secretary Robertson . . . . . 259*

## **BUILDING STRENGTH THROUGH COOPERATION •**

*by Ambassador Douglas Dillon . . . . . 268*

## **THE UNITED NATIONS IN TODAY'S WORLD • by**

*Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. . . . . 278*

*For index see inside back cover*



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## Communist Tactics in the Far East

by *Walter S. Robertson*

*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

In asking me to speak to you today you could well have anticipated my talking about the Far East. If I were not to talk to you about the Far East, I am not sure what I would talk about. Since taking over my duties in Washington 16 months ago, I have seldom had the luxury of thinking of anything else. I am often reminded of Mr. Kipling's warning, "If you've 'eard the East a-callin', you won't never 'eed naught else." I can testify that so far this has been my experience, although the call which comes out of the East today is a far cry from the one of which Mr. Kipling was thinking. My chief complaint is that I generally begin to hear the call mounting about 4:30 a. m., a call full of deep trouble—mass suffering, economic and political instability, social unrest—all complicated and compounded by the ideological struggle which holds our world in a grip of tension and uncertainty.

When I received your invitation to speak, I was fresh from the Conference at Geneva—if "fresh" is the word. In thinking of what I would say to you, I assumed you might be interested in the impressions I brought home from that Conference.

The Geneva Conference dealt with the two areas of armed conflict between Communist and non-Communist nations in the Far East—Korea and Indochina. The Berlin Conference of 3 months earlier had dealt primarily with two areas of political conflict in Western Europe—Germany and Austria.

Since the first of the postwar Conferences of Foreign Ministers, we had come a very long way in understanding the Communist menace. We had come a long way from those days when we had deluded ourselves into regarding the Soviet Union admiringly as a wartime partner in the struggle against a common enemy, when we were wont to talk as if the Soviet Union were a democracy—presumably on the grounds that it was opposed to Nazi Germany. We had come a long way from the time when American public opinion was

being indoctrinated with that subtle propaganda that the Chinese Communists were not real Communists but merely democratic revolutionaries for agrarian reform. We had come a long way from the time when, in 1947, we had been jolted into reality by Winston Churchill's blunt statement that the Soviet Union had rung down an iron curtain between its domains and the non-Communist world.

But if we had come a long way in those years, the Communist movement had also come a long way. Between 1940 and 1954, the lands and peoples of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, East Germany, Albania had been forced under the Soviet yoke. Having achieved at Yalta a key position in Manchuria as the price of its last-minute entry into the war with Japan already won by American arms and blood, the Soviets had made over to the Chinese Communists this invaluable base of operations along with the arms and military equipment surrendered by the Japanese. Thus mightily reinforced, the Chinese Communists, striking southward, had brought most of mainland China under their control by the end of 1949.

A few months later the Soviet Union and Communist China extended recognition to the so-called Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in Indochina, a revolutionary regime under the control of the Communist-dominated Viet Minh League. Having reached the northern border of Indochina, the Chinese Communists were in a position to give vital military assistance to the Viet Minh. This assistance, despite our aid to the French and their Vietnamese allies, was sufficient to enable the seven divisions of the Viet Minh army to bring all northern Viet-Nam under their control except for the delta of the Red River and Dien-Bien-Phu in the extreme west by the time the Geneva Conference opened. After an heroic defense, Dien-Bien-Phu fell when the Conference was only 2 weeks old.

The Communists have had a number of important setbacks during these postwar years—setbacks both in Western Europe and in the Far East. The reverses they have suffered have not, however, been achieved without enormous cost to the free world—

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Virginia State Convention of the American Legion at Richmond, Va., on July 30.



costs to the United States in military and economic aid programs totaling \$70 billion or more and, above all, costs in American lives. Of 142,000 American casualties, 23,365, in addition to hundreds of thousands of Koreans, were killed in defending the Republic of Korea against the Communist onslaughts.

Communist failures have been costly to the Communists too, but you may be certain the Communists are well content with the progress they have made in the past decade. They have every reason. Certainly the Communist representatives at Geneva, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Chou En-lai, and Mr. Pham Van Dong, gave every evidence of arrogant assurance and satisfaction, and the Soviet spokesman, Mr. Molotov, in particular, had an air of ease and affability you generally do not find among those who are wondering where their next meal is coming from.

### **The Communist Goals**

What do the Communists want? The answer is "the world"—their world, our world, everything. Aside from their ideological dedication, which fires their objective of communizing the world, they have two compelling and practical reasons for striving constantly to extend their domain: (1) they need the resources of other countries and (2) they do not feel safe while any country adjoining their empire is not 100 percent Communist. If only one country in the world remained outside their grasp, the Communists would still complain that they were encircled and threatened. This is not a baseless neurosis. Tyranny has never felt secure and has never been secure as long as freedom existed anywhere. The Soviet tyranny differs from previous tyrannies only in being immeasurably more thorough. Inside the Soviet Union every effort has been made to destroy the very concept of freedom, to produce a new type of man and woman—the Soviet man and Soviet woman—who would not know what to do with freedom if they had it, any more than a member of a colony of ants or a hive of bees would know what to do with freedom. Controls over life within Soviet Russia are matched by the barriers that are maintained around Soviet Russia, which hermetically seal it off from the outside world. The aim of Soviet policy is to proceed with the "communization" of the peoples within the bounds of the Soviet empire and, at the same time, to push the bounds of that empire constantly forward to incorporate additional countries.

What the Communists mean by "peaceful co-existence"—a phrase which you hear much these days—is a state of nonwar between their world and ours, in which the process of detaching pieces of our world and absorbing them in theirs can continue with minimum risk to themselves.

This was made very plain at Geneva. Every Communist proposal about Korea had as its sole

objective the taking over of all Korea by the Communist regime in the North. If elections were to be held, then the arrangements had to allow the Communist North with its 7 million inhabitants to be given the same weight as the anti-Communist South with its 20 million, to enable the spokesman of 7 million to veto every move by the spokesman for three times that number. A settlement in accordance with any other principle than that of Communist control and domination of all Korea would not even be considered by the Communists.

It was the same with Indochina. What the Communists were interested in negotiating was a French surrender. You could exhaust every weapon of logic in demonstrating that a commission to observe an armistice in Viet-Nam should be impartial, composed of Asian nations like Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia that had not taken sides in the cold war. But you would be wasting your time. The Communists would insist that the commission should include Poland and/or Czechoslovakia so that the commission could do absolutely nothing without Communist acquiescence. They have now been able to negotiate acceptance of a commission composed of India, Canada, and Poland under rules which require unanimity on all major questions "likely to lead to" a resumption of hostilities. Our experience in Korea makes us know what this means in practice—Poland will find ready excuses for vitiating any action disadvantageous to the Communists.

The Communists are dedicated to advancing their cause with a determination and single-mindedness that is hard for us even to visualize, let alone to equal. We are accustomed to seeing two sides to a case, or even three or four. And this is our pride. The Communists never see but one side. We have seen nothing in history to equal Communist fanaticism and bigotry, not even in the religious wars which at various times in the past came near to drowning various parts of the human race in blood. In the case of the Communists, however, fanaticism and bigotry are matched by a calculating, ruthless cunning.

### **Survival in the Communist World**

Years ago we used to hear a great deal about the merciless competition prevailing in American business and of the flint-hearted qualities it took to succeed in the business world. Perhaps we shall have a better picture of the officials who determine Communist policy if we can imagine the kind of competition *they* have to survive. In the Communist hierarchy the stakes are not money but life, and failure comes not in the form of bankruptcy but of the torture cell and the firing squad. Every man is your mortal enemy—your subordinates, your superiors—each waiting to strike the first time you slip. Among all those with whom you work, whom you see, whom you talk to, there is not one you can trust, not one who, if you should



err, if you should yield to an impulse of humanity, would not betray you without an instant's hesitation—would not *have* to betray you to save himself. Those who succeed in fighting their way to the top under such conditions are men who have conquered every scruple, whose concentration upon the amassing of power is unimpaired by any human weakness, undistracted by any other interest or consideration. Such are the men with whom you deal when you negotiate with the top Communist officials.

We may well ask whether there is any point in negotiating with the Communists at all. If what we have in mind achieving is any kind of give-and-take or any genuine understanding or basis of friendship, then, of course, there is no point whatsoever. The Communists are, however, ready to negotiate a termination of specific conflicts when they believe a termination is in their interests. In Korea, for example, the Communists had by last July decided that they stood to lose more than they would gain by continuing to refuse our terms and by prolonging the hostilities. In order to bring the war to an end, they even backed down on the point on which they laid the greatest stress. This was the question whether prisoners of war should be sent back, against their will, to the country of their origin, whether the U.N. would have to return to Communist control the nearly 50,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners in its hands who had declared they would resist with force any efforts to send them back.

While having agreed to an armistice at Panmunjom, the Communists at Geneva, however, as I have indicated, showed not the slightest intention to agree to a political settlement other than one that would extend their control over all Korea. At the same time, the fact that they were unable to obtain at the conference table the objective for which they originally launched the war—that is, control of the whole peninsula—has not led them to renew the war. Apparently they have given up the idea of achieving their objective by force—for the time being. The determining factor has been that our position in Korea has been a strong one.

I think we may believe that the Communists also strongly desired to end the fighting in Indochina. Hostilities there had been going on for 8 years, and, undoubtedly, the problem of war weariness among the people was a very real problem for the Viet Minh. The loss of life has been such that even Communists—though they may regard human beings only as workers or cannon fodder—could not be indifferent to it. The war had impoverished the country. Finally, the Communists could not be sure of what the United States would do in any given set of circumstances in Indochina. And I may say that I personally am convinced that Communist China does not for a moment wish to involve itself in hostilities with the United States. They need time, not only to consolidate their gains, but to repair an economy badly crippled by the

shortage of essential raw materials and to quell a swelling internal unrest.

On the other hand, the French were under the strongest political compulsion at home to end the war.

It was obvious at Geneva that the Communists had taken the measure of the French public attitude and had determined to play the game on the basis that it was less important to them to end the war than it was to the French. They made every effort to appear quite ready to go on fighting. In the period before the Geneva Conference, they greatly stepped up their military operations in Indochina with a view to enhancing, regardless of costs, their advantages at the conference table—advantages they pressed for all they were worth during the negotiations. The relationship in the Communists' minds between military action and negotiation has never been made clearer.

#### Our Role in Indochina

For its part, the United States was determined to do all it could to strengthen the French and Vietnamese position. We made clear our readiness to continue our massive support of the military effort of the French and their Vietnamese allies. We attempted to bring about united action in defense of Indochina. We indicated that we ourselves would be prepared to intervene with our own military forces on certain conditions. It might appear that these actions on our part were ineffectual. For the purposes intended they were, but it is probable that their effect was important and that without them an agreement even more unfavorable to the French, the anti-Communist Vietnamese, and the free world would have resulted.

It would be an understatement to say that we do not like the terms of the cease-fire agreement just concluded. However, not being a belligerent possessed of a primary responsibility, we were obviously in no position to dictate the terms under which others would or would not continue fighting. What is of first importance now is to prevent further Communist expansion—first by arousing Asia's unwitting masses to an awareness of the ruthless enslavement which threatens them, and second by the rapid organization of a collective defense pact in Southeast Asia. A bite here, a bite there, and the Asian pie would soon be eaten—with whetted appetite for other flavors certain to follow. If experience in Indochina has taught the free world to look the facts in the face and decide what it is willing to do to halt communism—as President Eisenhower suggested might be one good result—an effective defense of Southeast Asia should certainly be possible.

Experience teaches that all we can expect in negotiating with the Communists is the acceptance—tacit or expressed—of a situation that has already come about as a result of a power equation. The Communists press forward until the force of

resistance matches the force of their advance. At that point, you can get an agreement to stabilize the situation. The Communists will respect an agreement so long as—but no longer than—the opposing force is manifestly strong enough to make it more advantageous for them to maintain the agreement than to violate it. This almost makes it sound as if the only situations in which you can get an agreement with the Communists are those in which you can do without an agreement. And that is true. However—and this consideration is what guided us in our Korean policies—it is better to have a limited and uneasy agreement, provided, of course, it does not weaken your overall position, than to have continuing bloodshed even if the agreement does little more than stop the bloodshed.

There is another good reason for negotiating with the Communists, and this reason was very much in our minds when we agreed to the Berlin and Geneva Conferences. Throughout the world there is fear of another general war and a longing for peace both among the free peoples and the peoples behind the Iron Curtain. Because of the strength of these feelings, the Communists are under the greatest compulsion to make it appear that the tension existing in the world today—the threat of war that hangs over the human race—has its origin in the United States where the “Wall Street monopolists” are depicted as constantly devising strategies for the exploitation of the world.

It is essential that we expose, for what it is, this perversion of the truth upon which the whole Communist propaganda effort depends, with all its paraphernalia of peace appeals and peace congresses. Even though we know from experience that the chances of achieving through negotiation with the Communists a settlement of any of the outstanding sources of division between the Communist world and the free world, based on the rights of the peoples involved, are almost nil, we must still make clear by our readiness to negotiate that it is the Communists alone who stand in the way of such a settlement. However maddening it may be to try to negotiate with the Communists, such negotiations at least give us the opportunity to show the Communists up once more for what they are, to expose their determination to cling to their spoils, to hold forever to every acre of land, every village they have seized by whatever means.

You may question why it is necessary to keep on exposing the Communists—how there could be anyone left in the world who does not understand what kind of people the Communists are and what they are trying to do. The truth is, I suppose, that human beings are only too inclined to believe what they wish to believe. In addition to a profound ignorance of the nature and objectives of the Communist movement, there is a strong desire among many to believe that the differences between the

free countries and the Soviet camp—though these derive primarily from the expansionist drive inherent in the Communist movement—could readily be adjusted if only we could find a fair formula. There is a considerable sentiment in favor of relaxing the sanctions that have been imposed upon the Communists—dismantling the structure of trade controls, doing business with the Communists, and acquiescing in Chinese Communist representation in the U.N.—all of which would increase immeasurably the war potential of the Communist bloc and Red China's prestige throughout Asia.

#### Question of Red China in the U.N.

The recognition and seating of Red China in the United Nations is the cornerstone of Communist policy today—a policy aided and abetted by many free nations plus a subdued but active minority in this country. Why is our Government opposed? For the best of all reasons—

The U.N. is *not* an organization of *de facto* governments. It is an organization of nations which under its charter have renounced war as an instrument of national policy and have pledged themselves to take collective action to oppose aggression and preserve the peace. Red China is at war in Korea today. With whom? The United Nations. The war in Indochina was inflamed, supplied, and captained by Red China. The truce just concluded was negotiated with Mendès-France by Chou En-lai, the Red China Foreign Minister, not by Pham Van Dong, representing the Ho Chi Minh regime. Red China has also flagrantly violated the international obligations assumed by responsible governments. It has confiscated our properties and, incidentally, the properties of the British as well, despite Britain's prompt recognition in 1950. It has imprisoned our nationals without trial, tortured and brain-washed our soldiers. It is an outlaw-gangster regime, unpurged of its crimes and aggressions, and unfit to sit in any respectable family of nations.

You ask, is it not a farce to keep Red China out when Soviet Russia, an ally in its aggressions, is a member? A fair question. But it so happens we can't do anything about Russia's membership. Russia is a charter member, participating in the founding of the U.N. in 1945 at a time when she was an ally of the Western World, presumably subscribing to the obligations imposed by the charter. And being a charter member of the Security Council, it would be impossible to expel her whatever her repudiations or aggressions. Is this frustrating fact any reason for compounding the error? To the contrary, it is all the more reason for not increasing the power in the U.N. of a membership which flouts all the ideals and principles upon which the organization was founded.

Despite the Communist record, there is a feeling



in some quarters that if we would only modify our opposition to the Communists, the Communists might modify their opposition to us. Insofar as this spirit is the product of an intimate experience with war and a vivid apprehension of what World War III must be, we can certainly sympathize with it. But the fact that we do not share it does not mean that we are any less averse to war than anyone else. No nation in history has shown itself more eager than ours to avoid war except as a last resort in the face of triumphant aggression.

There is, however, another factor involved in this. The very resoluteness of our own opposition to the further expansion of communism has given others the chance to take a—what shall I say?—less extreme position and to rationalize their hopes for a meaningful *modus vivendi* between the two worlds. Back in 1946 and 1947, when it was by no means clear that the American people were going to recognize the Communist threat in Europe and Asia as a threat to their own security, the nations in the immediate path of Communist aggression were urging us to recognize the peril and to take measures against it. Today, because of the very strength that we have developed against Communist expansionism, others may feel they can afford to relax their own vigilance. What has happened has been inevitable. The nation or the individual that holds a preponderance of power is always the one that bears a preponderance of responsibility. There is a considerable amount of so-called neutralism in the world today, but I venture to say that in the back of every neutral's mind there is the realization that if neutralism is safe it is only because the United States is strong and is resolutely *not* neutral.

There was a time when the shoe was on the other foot, when we in America could afford an attitude of detachment, knowing that an aggressor in Europe would have to overcome the invincible British Navy and cross the seas before he could threaten us directly.

#### U.S. Responsibility

The task that devolved for so long upon Great Britain now devolves primarily upon us. It is up to us to provide the main strength in a coalition of peaceful nations threatened by aggression and, at the same time, to bear the largest responsibility for holding that coalition together. If we are to supply a unifying force on the side of the free nations today, we must demonstrate—not once or twice but in the daily conduct of our affairs—that what we are seeking in the world is what other free peoples are seeking, that we are striving not to impose a *pax Americana* or an American orthodoxy upon the world but to give every other people the chance to be what it wants to be. We must show that our power is power on the side of peace and not of war, that the prolongation of the cold

war is not of our choosing but is the sole responsibility of the Communists. To do this is not as easy as it sounds. Our very strength, our very preparedness, our very alertness to the Communist danger inevitably lend themselves to misinterpretation and give concern to those who—while they would be dismayed if we were not strong and ready—would like to think that, if only the United States would be more accommodating, the Communists might prove more tractable.

We shall always be under the temptation to let down our guard, to surrender our advantages, to demonstrate how amiable and accommodating we really are. For us to do so would, of course, mean the end of us all. Every day since my first intimate contact with the Communists back in 1945 I have had continuing reason to become convinced of one simple truth. That is that the only successful resistance to Communist expansionism is strength. Just as only strong societies achieve democratic self-government, only weak societies fall victim to communism. The weakness may be military or it may be political. In June 1950 we saw what happens when a country in the path of Communist expansionism is militarily weak. The Communists had tried by every artifice of subversion and penetration to undermine the Republic of Korea but had failed. They resorted, in consequence, to their military advantage and launched an attack of overwhelming force upon their victim. In Indochina we have seen the consequences of political weakness on the anti-Communist side. The Communists there were able to turn to their advantage the strongest political force of our times—the force of nationalism. They achieved ascendancy in the anticolonial movement because for so long the choice for the Vietnamese seemed to be between siding with Communists who were native or with the French, who were not. But military or political, it is always weakness that leads to Communist success. The free world must see to it that there are no more Koreas and no more Indochinas.

In concluding I should like to make a point that I have made before in speaking in public—a point I trust I shall never tire of making. Being a Virginian, I suppose I just assumed that it was Thomas Jefferson who originated the famous epigram, "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." It was something of a shock some years ago when I learned for the first time that Jefferson and the rest of his generation of Americans were just paraphrasing—and paraphrasing not an American but an Irishman by the name of John Philpot Curran. And what the Irishman said was much more meaningful than the American paraphrase. Speaking at Dublin in 1790, Curran warned, "It is the common fate of the indolent to see their rights become the prey of the active. The condition upon which God has given liberty to man is eternal vigilance." Could there be a more timely or pertinent inscription for our hearts and minds today?



## Conference on Collective Security In Southeast Asia

Press release 443 dated August 14

The Government of the United States has agreed with other like-minded Governments that the situation in Southeast Asia calls for the establishment of a collective security arrangement, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to strengthen the fabric of peace in the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

Accordingly, the Government of the Philippines having offered facilities in Baguio, the Foreign Ministers of the Governments concerned have agreed to meet there on September 6 to consider measures to further their common objectives in the area. This meeting follows consultations between the U.S. Government and other Governments over the past 4 months.<sup>1</sup>

## U.S.-Philippine Council To Meet in September

Press release 444 dated August 14

The United States and the Philippines have agreed to a meeting of the United States-Philippine Council, which was established on June 23 by an exchange of notes between the two Governments.<sup>2</sup> Secretary Dulles will accordingly meet with Philippine Vice President and concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos Garcia in the Philippines on September 4. Matters of mutual concern with respect to the defense of the Philippines will be discussed.

## Advance Notice of Philippine Trade Negotiation Hearings

Press release 436 dated August 11

The U.S. delegation for consultation and negotiation with a delegation from the Republic of the Philippines regarding possible modification of the 1946 Agreement on Trade and Related Matters gives notice that it will conduct public hearings and receive briefs from any interested person, partnership, or corporation at dates and places to be announced later.<sup>3</sup>

These hearings will be held during a recess in consultations between the two delegations. The consultations, which are expected to begin in

<sup>1</sup> Simultaneous announcements were released by the Governments of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of July 5, 1954, p. 14.

<sup>3</sup> Released simultaneously at Manila.

Washington in a few weeks, will cover all aspects of the 1946 agreement and any related matters, including particularly tariff arrangements, parity treatment, and currency provisions.

The 1946 agreement is based on the "Philippine Trade Act of 1946," (Public Law 371 of the 79th U.S. Congress). A continuation through December 31, 1955, of the reciprocal free trade provisions of the agreement was recently approved by the two Congresses (Public Law 474 of the 83d U.S. Congress) to permit time for the consultations and negotiations to which this notice refers.

## Economic Position of Japan

*News Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles*

Press release 435 dated August 10

The United States recognizes that one of the major postwar problems is the problem of finding opportunities whereby Japan, with its large and industrious population, can find a way to earn a useful and profitable living in the world.

Japan itself possesses very few natural resources, and it does not produce enough food for its people. It produces normally about 80 percent of the foodstuffs that the people require. This year it produced somewhat less because there was a bad failure of the rice crop. That means the Japanese have to be importing goods and raw materials and manufacturing raw materials into articles which the rest of the world needs. Goods which are distinctly of Japanese origin generally pay rather high tariff duties throughout the world because Japan has not been heretofore brought into the GATT organization, nor does it benefit from the reductions which have been made in tariff rates in favor of the distinctive products of many other countries.

It is the hope of the United States that steps may be taken to improve the opportunities for Japanese trade, not just in the United States, I will emphasize, but in other countries of the world where there are actually more natural markets for much of what Japan produces. There is no necessity actually to increase largely Japanese imports to the United States. What is needed, rather, is to try to find other areas of the world where the type of goods which Japan produces will be able to find markets.

The problem is a many-sided one. The negotiation of a trade agreement on a multilateral basis is one angle to the problem. Another angle to the problem is the need for an austerity program in Japan, which has been lacking somewhat over recent years but which seems to be taking shape at the present time. Also there is the importance of developing markets in Asia, particularly in the Southeast Asia area, where there are large popu-

lations which need the kind of things which Japan makes so well and which also produce food and raw materials which Japan needs.

All of these aspects of the problem need to be explored and I hope will be explored.

*Asked whether, in view of the fact that the administration asked for no economic assistance for Japan this year, it may be necessary for the United States to reconsider the possibility of some direct assistance to Japan this year, Mr. Dulles replied:*

It is possible, but we do not think that that will be necessary. It may be desirable to make available some foodstuffs to Japan out of our surplus food crops and to do so on terms which would be liberal from the standpoint of payment—possibly in terms of local currency. But we do not anticipate the necessity for any economic aid to Japan, on the assumption that the Japanese handle their own fiscal and commercial affairs with prudence and firmness.

It seems to us the situation can be dealt with without any direct economic aid. There is, of course, a certain amount of assistance that goes to Japan through our contribution to their enlarged security program. There are still a substantial number of U.S. troops in Japan who are spending money there. In that way there is a considerable amount of what you might call invisible exports to Japan which runs up into terms of several hundred million dollars. This is not nearly as big as it was at the height of the Korean War, when there were heavy purchases in Japan for use in Korea. There is a certain decline there, but the figure is still quite a substantial one.

## Aid to Refugees in Indochina

Harold E. Stassen, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, announced on August 5 that 2,000 tents to shelter 40,000 people are being rushed—some of them by airlift—from Japan to Viet-Nam for temporary use of refugees who leave their homes to escape the Communists. "We are glad to give assistance in this voluntary movement of people who wish to escape being forced to live in an area under Communist domination," Mr. Stassen said. "For this reason we are responding to the need of the Government of Viet-Nam in meeting this urgent requirement."

The tents are part of a program authorized by the Foreign Operations Administration from 1955 funds for relief and rehabilitation and other help to Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, which in the month of July amounted to \$2,060,000.

Mr. Stassen also announced that two Foa experts on refugee and resettlement programs have been temporarily transferred from Germany and Hong Kong to assist with the problem of refugees from North Viet-Nam.

"The tent airlift operation is to be completed today when the last planeload is scheduled to be set down in Saigon," Mr. Stassen said. "Five hundred more are due to arrive August 8 by ship, and 1,000 more are en route."

The 500 airlifted tents, packed in crates and weighing over 200,000 pounds, were all in Saigon 7 days after they were requested. Mr. Stassen said he received an urgent request from Saigon for the tents on July 29. The same day an arrangement was completed with the Department of Defense to supply them from stocks in Japan, and U.S. officials in Japan were instructed to rush them to Saigon. Twenty-five planes were used.

"On July 31 the airlift started," Mr. Stassen said, "and 500 more were loaded that same day on a ship which will arrive Sunday. The tents are being immediately set up in resettlement centers by the Government of Viet-Nam, which is mobilizing young men to prepare the sites. Foa is providing the hand tools for this work."

About two-thirds of the July authorizations—or \$1,350,000—is to meet relief and rehabilitation and other emergency needs resulting from the Geneva agreement to turn North Viet-Nam over to the Communist-led Viet Minh Government within 300 days.

The purchase of lumber and asbestos roofing and siding needed in the refugee shelter program was also approved. Various items, including hand tools and 11,373 blankets for the refugee reception centers, were approved. Existing government agency stocks are being tapped whenever possible to meet emergency needs.

Mr. Stassen said that \$50,000 was also authorized to pay for the cost of moving about \$1 million worth of U.S. cotton from Haiphong to Formosa to prevent it from falling into Communist hands. The cotton, which had been provided as U.S. economic aid to supply the textile mills of Northern Viet-Nam, had been warehoused at that port city. The purchase price paid by Formosa is to be applied to the Viet-Nam Foa program funds.

The remainder of the July procurement was authorized to provide materials needed for longer-range projects. It included \$90,000 worth of jute bags needed to sack Cambodia's next rice crop; \$165,000 worth of road construction equipment for Cambodia; and \$60,000 worth of steel pipe for Viet-Nam and \$40,000 worth for Cambodia, to maintain vital irrigation facilities.

Laos, which is landlocked and essentially dependent upon river transportation, received authorizations for the purchase of two diesel-powered towboats for \$275,000 and two truck-mounted cranes for use at the river ports of Voen Kam and Kinak for \$40,000. The boats and cranes will improve the movement of freight on the Mekong River which is an important link in the river-and-road connection between Saigon, Viet-Nam's capital, and Vientiane, the administrative capital of Laos.



Another \$40,000 authorization was for the purchase of public address systems and radio and audio-visual equipment to be used by the Laotian Information Service in expanding facilities for the dissemination of information to the population.

## Iranian Oil Settlement

### LETTERS TO U.S. NEGOTIATORS

White House press release dated August 7

*The White House on August 7 made public the following letters from the President to Herbert Hoover, Jr., and Loy W. Henderson, American Ambassador to Iran.<sup>1</sup>*

#### The President to Mr. Hoover

DEAR HERBERT: I want to express again my deep appreciation of your outstanding contribution to a realistic and equitable settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute which has so long been a threat to the stability of the Middle East.

My appreciation of the contribution you have made is enhanced by the fact that I have known something of the personal sacrifice you have made in order to assist us. I have in fact felt concerned, as the many months involved went by, by knowing that your absence from your own business affairs was extending far longer than we had originally planned. The fact that you chose, without urging, to stay with the problem until its solution, has been a great source of satisfaction to me and to members of the Cabinet.

The conclusion of this agreement, which promises to further progress in Iran as well as our objective of maintaining peace in the area, is due in significant measure to your expert knowledge of the international oil business, to your persistence and to your skillful diplomacy.

I am personally grateful to you.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

#### The President to Ambassador Henderson

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I want you to know that I personally appreciate the splendid results of your work on the oil problem in Iran. Your knowledge of the situation, your resourcefulness, your judgment and your tireless patience in the face of repeated frustration contributed greatly to the happy arrangements which have now been worked out.

The present solution of the Anglo-Iranian oil

<sup>1</sup> For earlier messages and statements relating to the oil settlement reached on Aug. 5, see BULLETIN of Aug. 16, 1954, p. 230.

dispute, for which you deserve such a large share of the credit, is a major achievement which will not only further our objectives in the Middle East but also contribute to our good relations with our European allies and our friends in other parts of the world as well.

I am most grateful to you for this successful effort on behalf of the Government and people of the United States.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

### REPLIES FROM IRANIAN LEADERS

White House press release dated August 9

*The White House on August 9 made public the following communication to the President from His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahinshah of Iran, together with a communication to Secretary Dulles from Foreign Minister Abdollah Entezam on behalf of Prime Minister Fazlollah Zahedi and himself.*

#### The Shahinshah to the President

MR. PRESIDENT: I am deeply grateful for your letter of August 5th and appreciate the friendly feelings which have inspired it.

It is, indeed, a source of satisfaction to me that my government has been able to arrive, in principle, at a settlement of the oil dispute, which, in the light of present world conditions, appears to be as equitable a solution of a difficult problem as could have been reached.

Ever since nationalization of the oil industry, which corresponded with the aspirations of my people, it has been my constant endeavor to facilitate and hasten a fair agreement within the framework of the relevant laws.

You can rest assured that the valuable contribution which you personally, Mr. President, The American Government and your distinguished Ambassador, Loy Henderson, have made to this end is highly prized.

It is now my hope that the implementation of the agreement will not be long delayed.

With the attainment of this goal and with increased American assistance, I share your feeling that we may look forward to an era of economic and social development which will improve the lot of my people, as well as further consolidate the security of the Middle East.

I cannot sufficiently lay stress on the fact that American assistance to Iran has been most timely and helpful. My people reciprocate to the full the friendship of your noble nation.

Whilst renewing the expression of my gratitude for your cooperation, I tender warm wishes for the welfare of the American people under your wise leadership.

Yours Sincerely,

MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI

Department of State Bulletin



## Foreign Minister Entezam to Secretary Dulles

EXCELLENCY: I am deeply grateful for the sincere congratulations extended by Your Excellency to His Excellency the Prime Minister and myself on the occasion of the reaching of an agreement in principle between the Government of Iran and the Iranian National Oil Company and the representatives of eight companies, and I especially consider it to be my duty to express my sincere gratitude for the sincere efforts of the Government of the United States of America in rendering this agreement possible.

I hope that substantial quantities of Iranian oil, which represent our major national resource, will begin to flow abroad at the earliest possible time, and that the Imperial Iranian Government will be able with revenues derived therefrom to carry out its economic and social programs for raising the standards of living of the Iranian people. I realize that the execution of these programs will play an important part in the maintenance of peace and international security and I am sure that the honorable officials of the United States of America are doing all they can to assist in the economic and social development of Iran.

I avail myself of the opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my high consideration.

ABDOLLAH ENTEZAM

## The "Good Partner" Policy

Press release 432 dated August 10

*At his news conference on August 10, Secretary Dulles was asked about the reference of President Eisenhower to the term "good partners" and in that connection to the impression created abroad that the United States in the past had attempted to use foreign aid as a political leverage to "coerce or cajole" foreign countries to move in a direction we thought best. Mr. Dulles made the following reply:*

Well, I did not find that there was anything startling in the way of an innovation in that expression of the President's. It seems to me that has been the policy of the United States and of the Eisenhower administration in particular, since we came into office. As I say, I did not regard it

myself as being the expression of any new or different policy from what we have been pursuing.

I can recall a statement which I made about a year ago in which I very explicitly rejected any idea of coercion.<sup>1</sup> I said we did not want to have allies who are subject to coercion; that we wanted them to be independent and able to act in their own right; and that allies which were in effect "satellites" were not what we wanted at all. In fact, the independence of judgment which is finding expression in many friendly and allied states seems to me to mark the success of our policy—not its failure.

We have been helping to build these countries up into strong, self-reliant, independent countries, capable of expressing a viewpoint which would usefully contribute to the consensus of judgment of the free world. We want them to be able to act in that capacity, and the fact that they now have that capacity is, I say, a mark of the success of our policy—not a mark of its failure.

## Launching of St. Lawrence Power Project

*Following is the text of a message from President Eisenhower read by Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York at ground-breaking ceremonies for the St. Lawrence River power development project, held on August 10 at Massena, N. Y., and Cornwall, Ontario.<sup>2</sup>*

On this very happy occasion marking the beginning of the fulfillment of a dream we have long cherished, I extend my best wishes to Prime Minister St. Laurent and Governor Dewey and my heartiest congratulations to the officials of the Ontario Hydroelectric Commission and the New York Power Authority.

The St. Lawrence project, which will bring so many material blessings to the people of our two countries, will be yet another strand in the strong fabric that binds the destinies of Canada and the United States.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 14, 1953, p. 811.

<sup>2</sup> For background on the project, see BULLETIN of July 14, 1952, p. 65; Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1019; and Nov. 23, 1953, p. 724.

## Building Strength Through Cooperation

by Douglas Dillon<sup>1</sup>

Ambassador to France

I am very honored to be with you today and to participate with you in the celebration of the 10th anniversary of our common victory over the forces of aggression and darkness.

I am particularly proud to be present at the inauguration of this magnificent monument that will recall forever that it was here that the forces of General Patton broke through to open up across France the "Voie de la Liberté."

Our debt to those who fought and died here and our responsibility toward them is great. Let us show a measure of our gratitude not only by recalling their sacrifices, as we do today, but by continuing to exert all our energies, all our minds, and all our wills to preserve and strengthen the peace and freedom for which they fought and, having achieved them, which they entrusted to us.

Today, we recall with special poignancy that only a short 10 years ago there was war here. The cannons are stilled now, and the men in uniform we see around us are part of the defensive shield behind which the free nations have grouped themselves in order to protect the fruits of their victory and to work together to efface the scars of war.

I shall not speak to you of the nightmare that is war. You know only too well what it is. You experienced its horrors at firsthand. All of you suffered because of it.

Terrible destruction was the inevitable consequence of the drive by General Patton's divisions toward victory. But you have worked with magnificent courage and with success in rebuilding your city. I have heard that your gardens are resplendent with flowers and that your industry and horticulture are thriving. The wounds of war have almost entirely disappeared. For myself, I am delighted to be a guest of your lovely city. As millions of other Frenchmen, you have raised your country from the ruins and have returned it to its

traditional role as an example and an inspiration to free men everywhere.

As awful as was the last world war, it taught us that we should not despair for the future. It showed us what can be accomplished when men work together courageously and with good will toward a common goal.

But the hopes for continued cooperation, which flamed so high in the flush of victory 9 years ago, have flickered dangerously low since then. And the foundation for peacetime unity, built at such a heavy price, has been subjected to terrible strains.

Today I would like to be able to say that the last world war convinced all nations of the wrongness and the futility of territorial aggrandizement by force of arms and the oppression of other peoples.

But we know this conviction did not become universal. We know it by bitter experience that has again cost human life and anguished our homes. We have seen this in Korea and in Indochina where, may we say with gratitude, now the guns are stilled.

We know too that if we are to survive, if hope is to be kept alive for a future free from fear, then we must look at the world as it is and not simply as we would like it to be. And we must guide ourselves accordingly, building defenses in unity around the peace so dearly won.

We have learned, however, that there is a key to victory in both peace and war. That key is cooperation, based on mutual trust. It was the cornerstone on which we together built the victory of 1945. It is equally the cornerstone of the effort our free nations are now making to keep the peace.

This idea of peace through strength and of collective action in the face of danger is not new. One hundred and sixty years ago, President George Washington wrote to the Congress of the United States that "if we desire to secure peace . . . it must be known that we are at all times ready for war." And in 1945, Gen. George Marshall wrote: "We must, if we are to realize the

<sup>1</sup> Translation of an address delivered in French at the inauguration of the General George Patton Memorial at Avranches, France, on July 31.



hopes we may now dare have for lasting peace, enforce our will for peace with strength. We must make it clear to the potential gangsters of the world that if they dare break our peace they will do so at their great peril."

To implement this hope and to meet this need, the free nations have banded together for mutual security and have pledged collective action in the event of aggression.

Thus it was that 14 nations including France and the United States joined together in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And the European Defense Community, when it comes into effect, will coalesce the forces of six West European nations in a common front to discourage all aggression.

I would like to emphasize the defensive character of these treaties. They were not conceived in 1945 when victory was ours and the world seemed on the threshold of a new and enlightened era in which wars would not happen because no one would want them to happen. They were conceived as the direct result of the threat posed against the free nations by the leaders of Soviet communism and their satellites in the years following the war. I refer to refusal of the Soviet Union, at the end of the war, to follow the lead of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the other Western nations in disarmament. I refer to the Soviet buildup of aggressive military forces in its satellite neighbors, and of the Communist efforts against peace in Prague, in Berlin, in Indochina, in Korea, and elsewhere.

This threat of aggressive communism still exists. So long as it does exist, nations and peoples who value their freedom must stand together against the common danger, ready for war in order to remain at peace.

I have referred to cooperation among the free nations during the last war and in the years since then. But I have spoken chiefly of the military aspects of this cooperation.

There are of course other aspects, embodied in the United Nations, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the Coal and Steel Community, the Marshall plan, and the point 4 program to aid underdeveloped areas. Nor are these less important aspects of international cooperation. They could be, and indeed should become, the very keystone of the peace that so many have fought to achieve.

It is by our constant dedication to the principle of strength through cooperation and unity that we can best repay our debt to the valiant soldiers of General Patton whom we honor today.

## **U.S. Planes To Use Dutch Airbase**

Press release 445 dated August 14

In furtherance of general NATO objectives, the Governments of the United States and the Nether-

lands have agreed that a fighter squadron of the USAF will be stationed at the Dutch airbase of Soesterberg in the near future. The two Governments have entered into an agreement concerning the juridical, fiscal, and other problems relative to the stationing of this American unit in the Netherlands.

Through this agreement the foundation has been laid for a form of cooperation which is of the utmost importance for the defense of the Netherlands. It increases the individual and joint capacity of allied nations to resist armed attack, an important objective of NATO and of U.S. foreign policy.

The agreement was signed on August 13 at The Hague and will come into effect as soon as Dutch Parliamentary approval has been obtained.

## **Disposition of German Assets**

White House press release dated August 10

*Following is an exchange of correspondence between the President and Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.*

### **The President to Chancellor Adenauer**

AUGUST 7, 1954

DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR: I was very much interested in your views on the question of the disposition of vested German assets in the United States, contained in your letter of July 17, 1954; and I appreciate the spirit in which your comments were offered.

You refer particularly in your letter to the hardships imposed on a large number of persons, many now advanced in years and without other means of support, whose small holdings in this country, in the form of pensions, life insurance policies, interests in estates, and bank deposits, have been vested. You state that early action to provide relief in such cases would be a major contribution to the strengthening of the ties of friendship between our two countries.

Because of the great dislocation in the German economy which took place as a result of the war, the Allied Governments decided to look to German assets in their territories as a principal source for the payment of their claims against Germany. The recovery of the German economy, which has progressed so rapidly and so well under your administration, was thus not hampered by a large reparation burden. In considering the problem of the vested assets, it is necessary therefore to take into account legitimate claims on the part of American citizens arising out of the war for which some provision should be made, if the original approach is reversed.

I am aware of the measures taken by the German Federal Government under your high-minded leadership to contribute to the relief of victims of

August 23, 1954



Nazi persecution,<sup>1</sup> and to re-establish normal economic and commercial relations with the countries of the free world. I also share your sympathy with individuals in straitened circumstances in Germany for whom the operation of the vesting program in this country created particular hardships. I am hopeful that it may be possible to take some remedial action in such cases, and at the same time provide some measure of compensation to those American nationals who incurred losses arising out of the war, with resultant hardship in many cases.

As you know, the solution of this complex of problems lies with the Congress. Several bills dealing with the subject are now pending there, and members of my Cabinet and other Government officials have appeared and expressed their views.<sup>2</sup> None of the measures thus far proposed have the approval of my Administration, but you may be assured that this problem is receiving earnest consideration and it is my hope that a fair, equitable and satisfactory solution can be arrived at.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

#### Chancellor Adenauer to the President

JULY 17, 1954

MR. PRESIDENT: The Federal Government follows with special interest efforts of the US Congress to find a solution to the question of seized German assets in the United States. Despite the favorable development of relations between our two countries, this problem has remained unresolved. A solution to it is a special wish of my government. Thousands of Germans who through no fault of their own find themselves in an unfortunate economic situation, old people and pensioners, beneficiaries of insurance policies and inheritances, hope that now, nine years after the end of hostilities, their property will be released. Among them are numerous persons who have lost their means of livelihood and homes as a consequence of the war. For all of them an early release would alleviate their hardships. Many Germans would be able to build their lives anew with these means. Moreover, seizure of these assets has affected precisely those German firms and persons, who through personal and business connections with the United States, have for many years

<sup>1</sup> For an article on these programs, see BULLETIN of July 26, 1954, p. 126.

<sup>2</sup> For texts of a statement and a letter by Secretary Dulles, see *ibid.*, July 12, 1954, p. 69.

formed the traditional bridge of friendship between our two countries. For them as well, the unresolved problem is an element of uncertainty.

In the opinion of the Federal Government and of the entire German public, the Federal Republic has expressed its will to contribute to reconstruction on the basis of common principles of the Western world through recognition of German foreign obligations in the London debt agreement, through ratification of the Bonn and Paris agreements, and through conclusion of the Israeli agreement. An early solution to this problem lies specially close to the hearts of myself and my government. It would not only have a far-reaching favorable psychological effect in that it would give the German people a feeling of security and increase its moral strength, it would also make a considerable contribution to furthering the friendship between our two peoples, so promisingly begun.

As head of the government of the Federal Republic, may I voice a request to you, Mr. President, that a contribution will also be made from your side that the hopes, so recently given life, will not be disappointed. Accept, Mr. President, the expression of my highest consideration.

ADENAUER

#### U.K. Grants Perpetual Rights for American Military Cemetery

Press release 438 dated August 12

The Government of the United Kingdom has granted the United States perpetual rights to the use of the land occupied by the American Military Cemetery near Madingley, England. In informing the United States of this decision the British Foreign Office stated:

As a contribution toward the happy relationship between this country and the United States of America, the University of Cambridge have now arranged for the land in question . . . to be conveyed, in the form of a gift, to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. As a result of the discussions, Her Majesty's Government are ready to make the land . . . available to the American Battle Monuments Commission for use as a cemetery . . . for as long as it may be required for that purpose.

This generous and thoughtful gesture on the part of the University of Cambridge and the British Government will enable the United States, through the American Battle Monuments Commission, to maintain the ground, 3 miles west of the city of Cambridge, as a perpetual monument to the 3,811 U.S. servicemen who are buried there.

## Aid to Flood Areas of Eastern and Central Europe

### MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT

*On August 12 the White House released the following memorandum from the President addressed to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Director of Foreign Operations.*

White House press release dated August 12

In accordance with my statement of July 29, 1954,<sup>1</sup> with regard to the extension of aid throughout the flood areas of Eastern and Central Europe, and in accordance with the recommendation contained in the memorandum of August 12, 1954, submitted by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and pursuant to the authority vested in me by Title II of Public Law 480, 83d Congress, 2d Session, I hereby determine that up to \$4,000,000 worth of agricultural commodities from the stocks of the Commodity Credit Corporation may be used for the purpose of providing emergency assistance in meeting flood and other urgent requirements in Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Soviet Zone of Germany. The maximum amount of \$4,000,000 is computed on the basis of the Corporation's investment in the commodities made available for export, including processing, packaging, inland transportation within the United States, and handling costs.

The Secretary of State shall conclude any necessary bilateral agreements with the governments concerned in connection with the furnishing of this assistance.

Arrangements for the operations of this relief program, including the specifications of the commodities and the provision of Mutual Security funds to cover the costs of ocean transportation of the commodities, shall be the responsibility of the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration and the transfer of the commodities shall be upon such terms and conditions as the Director determines to be appropriate, after consultation with the Secretary of State.

### ACCEPTANCE BY HUNGARY

*White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty on August 12 issued the following statement:*

The President has been informed that the Hungarian Government has accepted his offer of help to the flood victims in that country. Foreign Minister Boldocsky has expressed his Government's

warm thanks to the President and the American people.

The President is gratified that his offer has been accepted. The League of Red Cross Societies has been requested to get in touch with the Hungarian Red Cross to work out the necessary details.<sup>2</sup>

### LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR CONANT TO SOVIET COMMISSIONER IN EAST GERMANY

*On August 6 the following letter from U.S. High Commissioner for Germany James B. Conant was delivered to the office of the Soviet High Commissioner, Georgi M. Pushkin.*

I refer to your letter of August 5<sup>3</sup> and I am gratified by your acceptance of the offer of relief for flood sufferers in Eastern Germany, made by the President of the United States in his message of July 29.

As indicated in the President's message, it is the intention of my Government that the carrying out of this program should be entrusted to private welfare agencies. The League of Red Cross Societies has been requested to assume this task. I am confident that representatives of this welfare agency will be happy to discuss and develop detailed arrangements with anyone you may designate. I trust that these arrangements may be developed without undue delay in order that the suffering of flood victims may be relieved as soon as possible.

### Yuri A. Rastvorov Granted Asylum

Press release 441 dated August 13

### U.S. NOTE TO U.S.S.R.

*The Department of State on August 13 transmitted to the Soviet Embassy a note concerning the case of Yuri A. Rastvorov, former official of the Soviet Mission in Japan. The text of the note is as follows:*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, with reference to the Embassy's inquiries regarding the whereabouts of Mr. Y. A. Rastvorov, has the honor to inform him that Mr. Rastvorov has requested the appropriate American authorities that he be granted political asylum.

<sup>1</sup> On Aug. 17 Mr. Hagerty announced that Czechoslovakia also had accepted the President's offer.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 16, 1954, p. 240.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 9, 1954, p. 197.



Mr. Rastvorov's request has been granted and he is now residing in the United States. If the Ambassador wishes to talk with Mr. Rastvorov, he is available for an interview immediately.

#### DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STATEMENT

*The Department of Justice has issued the following statement with regard to the authorization granted to Mr. Rastvorov in connection with his entry into the United States:*

Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., announced today that Yuri A. Rastvorov, the Soviet official who sought the protection and assistance of American authorities, has been granted temporary entry into the United States under the auspices of the Department of State, and is now in this country. The Japanese Government has been kept appropriately advised.

His entry was authorized under the discretionary powers vested in the Attorney General by the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Yuri A. Rastvorov has been in consultation with American officials since his arrival in the United States. He has also been interviewed in the United States by Japanese officials.

#### MR. RASTVOROV'S REQUEST FOR ASYLUM

I, Yuri Alexandrovich Rastvorov, motivated solely by my own wishes, and for political reasons, hereby request the United States Government for political asylum.

YURI ALEXANDROVICH RASTVOROV

JANUARY 24, 1954

#### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Yuri A. Rastvorov was born July 11, 1921, in Dmitrovsk, in Central Russia. His parents had one other child, a son who died in infancy.

Rastvorov's mother, who was a physician, died in 1946. His father, an army officer, retired in 1947 with the rank of colonel and was last reported living in Moscow.

Rastvorov attended middle school in Moscow and studied at the Geodesy Institute there.

He was drafted into the army in November 1939 and was assigned to the Institute of Oriental Languages in Moscow the following year. The Institute was maintained by the military intelligence division of the Soviet army for language and other special training for intelligence work in the Far East. Rastvorov was commissioned a second lieutenant in the military intelligence service in 1941.

In February 1943 he was transferred from mili-

tary intelligence to the secret political police (NKGB) and assigned to the NKGB Intelligence Directorate in Moscow.

He was sent to Japan in January 1946, ostensibly as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs employee but in reality as an espionage agent of the Ministry of State Security (MGB) later the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). He returned to Moscow in late 1946 and was reassigned to Japan in June 1950. Although performing the same duties as before Rastvorov was now listed as a second secretary of the Soviet Mission.

He had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the MVD when he sought sanctuary in the United States early this year.

Rastvorov married Galina Andreyevna Godova in January 1945 in Moscow. They have one child, Tatiyana, born in October 1945.

#### STATEMENT BY MR. RASTVOROV\*

[Translation]

I wanted to live like a decent human being. I wanted to be treated decently and I wanted to be able to treat other people decently.

It is impossible to live like this under communism. People do not dare treat each other decently or trust each other or speak freely to each other.

In all my life until I came to America I had only one friend with whom I could speak fairly freely without fear. He was killed in the war. I could not even speak freely with members of my own family.

When I was a baby, my mother had me baptized. But she was so afraid of what the Communists would do to her for this that she had me baptized secretly. She did not even tell my father.

When I was a child, my grandfather—my father's father—owned a small farm near Orel. He had two horses and a cow. Since he had no one to help him work the farm, he once hired a man to help him get the crops in during the harvest. For this the Communists called him a kulak—a rich peasant—and took away everything he had and made it impossible for him to earn a living any other way.

My mother sent my grandfather bread secretly from time to time without letting even my father find out about it. But my father did not dare do anything to help. He stopped seeing his father. He was afraid that if he did the Communists would punish him. My grandfather starved to death in 1930.

My father had a brother who was an army doctor. He was taken prisoner by the Germans in the Second World War. When he was freed, the Communists sent him—like thousands of

\* Made to correspondents on Aug. 13.



others—to a “quarantine” camp to check on his reliability. He was kept there for 3 years. When he was released, I was afraid to see him or have anything to do with him, in spite of the fact that I was extremely fond of him. I was afraid I would be punished if I did, maybe dismissed from government service, because he was under suspicion and always would be for having been in contact—as a prisoner—with the outside world.

This is what life is like under communism. These are the sorts of things communism does to people.

I tried hard all my life to believe in this system but I could not. From the time I began to understand life a little, the things I saw made me feel more and more doubt and bitterness and hatred.

Finally all this—especially after I saw with my own eyes how people live their own lives and how they get along with each other in free countries—made me decide to leave forever a fatherland which the Communists had turned into a concentration camp.

Now I hope I can make a new life in this country, a normal life like the lives of other people. I hope I can become an American like other Americans.

## Status of Negotiations on Atomic Pool Plan

Press release 434 dated August 10

*In view of the fact that the President, at his August 4 news conference, referred questions concerning the atomic pool plan to Mr. Dulles, the Secretary, at his news conference on August 10, was asked if he would elaborate on the status of the negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on this plan. Mr. Dulles made the following reply:*

I think the broad history of this is pretty well known although not the details, because we agreed, in the beginning, that we would try to handle this particular matter in terms of an exchange of diplomatic notes and private talks. Some people had felt that it would be possible to make better progress with the Russians if instead of having public diplomacy we tried to negotiate quietly and privately with them. So it was agreed with them and, in fact, suggested by the President's message of December 8 to the United Nations Assembly<sup>1</sup> that we would have private talks on this matter.

I am sorry to say that the private talk method does not seem to work any better than the public talk method. I am afraid that the difficulties in dealing with the Soviets are so fundamental that the getting of positive cooperative action involves something more than a change of method.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.

I had several talks with Mr. Molotov at Berlin and at Geneva, and we gave him various notes which had been prepared in concert with some of our allies who are principally concerned, which elaborated the President's program.

I still do not feel at liberty to disclose the texts of what was said or describe these talks in detail because, as I said, we had agreed on the private exchange-of-note method. I can say that the last note which we had on this matter was wholly negative, or perhaps I should say 99 percent negative. We have in substance asked the Soviets whether they wish it to be treated as 100 percent negative.

In the meanwhile we are making plans on the assumption that we will have to treat it as 100 percent negative. In that event we hope to go ahead with the program in association with other countries. There are several in a position to contribute material to the program and many which would like to benefit from the program in terms of exploring and developing the possibilities of atomic energy for peacetime, lifegiving purposes. That phase of the matter is being actively considered while we await what may be the final answer from the Soviet.

*Asked whether this consideration was in consultation with the other countries concerned, Mr. Dulles replied:*

The concrete plan which was proposed to the Soviet Union was considered actively, before it was submitted, with some of the allies who are most interested in the problem from the standpoint of being able to contribute fissionable material.

Now, the adaptation of that program to one which would eliminate the hope for cooperation of the Soviet Union, that program, in the first instance, is still being considered by the United States Government, and we have not yet gotten in detail into talks with our associates about that phase of the problem. But that would presumably come at an early stage.

*Asked whether the exchange of notes between this country and the Soviet Union would be released when that position was reached, Mr. Dulles replied:*

That would require an agreement on both sides, and I cannot say whether or not the Soviet Union would care to have the exchange of notes made public.

## Foreign Claims Commission

The Senate on August 6 confirmed Whitney Gilliland and Henry J. Clay to be members of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.

## Detention of Staff Members of U.S. Embassy at Moscow

### DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 429 dated August 6

Arthur Hasler, an Assistant Naval Attaché of the U.S. Embassy at Moscow, and Miss Joyce Marshall, a translator on the Embassy staff, were arrested by Soviet police on the afternoon of August 4, 1954, in an unrestricted area on the outskirts of Moscow and were detained at a police station for approximately 3 hours. Their arrest was based on the charge that they were allegedly taking photographs of the Stalin Auto Works. Their cameras were taken from them and the films were confiscated. They refused to sign a document drawn up by the Soviet police regarding the incident and stated that their confiscated films would prove that they had not taken photographs of the Stalin Auto Works or of any prohibited objects. They were finally released at the request of the Embassy.

The Embassy submitted a note to the Soviet Foreign Office in Moscow on August 5, 1954, strongly protesting the illegal detention of Mr. Hasler and Miss Marshall. The Embassy's note requested that disciplinary action be taken against the Soviet police officials concerned and that assurances be given against a repetition of such action.

### TEXT OF U.S. NOTE OF AUGUST 5

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to draw the Ministry's attention to the following matter.

On August 4, 1954, at approximately 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon Assistant U.S. Naval Attaché, Lieutenant Arthur Hasler and Joyce Marshall, Attaché of the Embassy, were returning from a picnic at Kolomenskoe by way of the ferry across the Moscow River from Nagatino. As they waited for the ferry two police officers approached them and, although Lieutenant Hasler and Miss Marshall identified themselves as diplomats by presenting their diplomatic cards, demanded their cameras. When Lieutenant Hasler and Miss Marshall refused to give up their cameras, the police officers took them by force against the Americans' protests. The police officers then insisted that Lieutenant Hasler and Miss Marshall accompany them to the Nagatino police station nearby. The Americans went only under protest and to avoid the further application of force by the police officers.

At the police station the American couple was held against their will for about three hours, although they demanded that they be released. They were also prevented from telephoning to the American Embassy for about one and one-half hours and they were subjected to the indignity of being photographed by police photographers. Finally, their films were confiscated and not returned to them by the police officers, although Lieutenant Hasler demanded their return. They were finally released at 8:15 p. m. only after the intervention, at the Embassy's request, of an officer from the Foreign Liaison Section of the Soviet Defense Ministry.

At the time of their arrest and during their detention the charge made against Lieutenant Hasler and Miss Marshall was that they had photographed factory buildings of the Stalin Auto Works across the river from Nagatino while they were waiting for the ferry at the latter point. This accusation was completely untrue, as the films confiscated by the police will show.

By their actions in this incident the Soviet police officials concerned violated the diplomatic immunity of two members of the Embassy staff. They arrested and detained the American diplomats. They seized the latter's cameras by force and confiscated their films. They photographed the two Americans without permission. As the Ministry is aware, these actions are incompatible with international custom, with the Soviet law defining the immunities of foreign diplomats (a portion of which is printed in the diplomatic card), and with the reciprocal immunities accorded Soviet diplomats in the United States.

The Embassy requests that the Ministry arrange an immediate investigation to allocate responsibility for the improper treatment of the American diplomats and that disciplinary action be taken against the offending police officers. The Embassy also assumes the Ministry will take appropriate measures to prevent repetition of similar violations of the diplomatic immunity of American diplomats stationed in the U.S.S.R.

### Changes in Rates of Duty on Watch Movements

White House press release dated July 27

The President on July 27 issued a proclamation putting into effect recommendations of the U.S. Tariff Commission, made under section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, with respect to the rate of duty on imports of non-jeweled watches and watches containing not more than 17 jewels. The proclamation modifies the duty concessions on certain types of watches provided for in the trade agreement with Switzerland.

The effect of this action is to establish rates of



duty ranging up to 50 percent above present rates but in no event above the original rates set in the Tariff Act of 1930. On some imported watch movements there will be no change in duty. While the amount of additional duty will vary for different types of movements, the range in duty increases, added to landed cost on regular unadjusted movements which constitute the bulk of the imports, will be from 9 cents to \$1.15 per movement. The new rates will become effective on July 28, 1954, but will not apply to articles exported before that date provided they are cleared through U.S. customs on or before August 26, 1954.

The U.S. Tariff Commission, in a report transmitted to the President on May 28, 1954, found that watches are being imported in such increased quantities as to cause serious injury to the American watch manufacturing industry.<sup>1</sup> The Commission recommended that in order to remedy this serious injury to the domestic industry, rates of duty upon certain types of watches should be increased. These findings and recommendations formed the basis for the action announced by the President.

The President's action will have an important collateral effect in contributing to the maintenance of a satisfactory industrial mobilization base for the domestic production of watch movements and other precision devices necessary for national defense.

An Interdepartmental Committee on the Jeweled Watch Industry has recently reported to the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization that preservation of the unique skills of this industry is essential to the national security.<sup>2</sup>

#### Text of Proclamation<sup>1</sup>

1. WHEREAS, under authority of section 350 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the President on January 9, 1936, entered into a trade agreement with the Swiss Federal Council, including two schedules and a declaration annexed thereto (49 Stat. (pt. 2) 3918), and by proclamation of January 9, 1936 (49 Stat. (pt. 2) 3917), proclaimed the said trade agreement, which proclamation has been supplemented by proclamation of May 7, 1936 (49 Stat. (pt. 2) 3959), and proclamation of November 28, 1940 (54 Stat. (pt. 2) 2461); and

2. WHEREAS the said trade agreement was supplemented on October 13, 1950, by certain provisions set forth in the 13th recital of the President's proclamation of November 26, 1951 (Proclamation No. 2954; 16 F. R. 11943); and

3. WHEREAS the said trade agreement includes duty concessions granted by the United States with respect to products described in item 367 (a) of Schedule II of the said trade agreement (49 Stat. (pt. 2) 3940); and

4. WHEREAS, to carry out the said trade agreement, since February 15, 1936, duties at the rates respectively specified in the said item 367 (a) have been applied to the products described in such item, which duties reflect the

duty concessions granted in the said trade agreement with respect to such products; and

5. WHEREAS the United States Tariff Commission has submitted to me its report of an investigation, including a hearing, under section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended, as a result of which the Commission has found that certain products described in the said item 367 (a) are, as a result in part of the duties reflecting the concessions granted thereon in the said trade agreement, being imported into the United States in such increased quantities, both actual and relative, as to cause serious injury to the domestic industries producing like or directly competitive products; and

6. WHEREAS the Tariff Commission has recommended that the duty concessions granted in the said trade agreement with respect to certain products described in the said item 367 (a) be modified to permit the application to such products of higher rates of duty hereinafter proclaimed, which rates the Commission found and reported to be necessary to remedy the serious injury to the domestic industries producing like or directly competitive products; and

7. WHEREAS section 350 (a) (2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (48 Stat. 943), authorizes the President to proclaim such modifications of existing duties as are required or appropriate to carry out any foreign trade agreement that the President has entered into under the said section 350 (a); and

8. WHEREAS upon the modification of duty concessions in the said trade agreement as recommended by the Tariff Commission it will be appropriate, to carry out the said trade agreement, as supplemented on October 13, 1950, to apply to the said products the rates of duty hereinafter proclaimed:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and by section 7 (c) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, and in accordance with the said trade agreement as supplemented October 13, 1950, do proclaim—

(a) That the provisions of item 367 (a) of Schedule II of the said trade agreement shall be modified, effective at the close of business July 27, 1954, so as to read as follows:

United States Tariff Act of 1930 paragraph	Description of articles	Rate of duty
367 (a)	Watch movements, and time-keeping, time-measuring, or time-indicating mechanisms, devices, and instruments, whether or not designed to be worn or carried on or about the person, all the foregoing, if under 1.77 inches wide, whether or not in cases, containers, or housings:	
	(1) Having more than 1 and not more than 17 jewels:	
	Over 1.5 inches wide	\$1.25 each.
	Over 1.2 but not over 1.5 inches wide	\$1.35 each.
	Over 1 but not over 1.2 inches wide	\$1.35 each.
	Over 0.9 but not over 1 inch wide	\$1.75 each.
	Over 0.8 but not over 0.9 inch wide	\$2.00 each.
	Over 0.6 but not over 0.8 inch wide	\$2.02½ each.
	0.6 inch or less wide	\$2.50 each.

<sup>1</sup>Copies of the report may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D. C.

<sup>2</sup>Requests for copies of this report should be addressed to the Office of Defense Mobilization, Washington 25, D. C.

<sup>3</sup>No. 3062; 19 Fed. Reg. 4659.

- (2) Having no jewels or only one jewel:
- Over 1.5 inches wide \$0.75 each.
  - Over 1.2 but not over 1.5 inches wide \$0.84 each.
  - Over 1 but not over 1.2 inches wide \$0.93 each.
  - Over 0.9 but not over 1.0 inch wide \$1.05 each.
  - Over 0.8 but not over 0.9 inch wide \$1.12½ each.
  - Over 0.6 but not over 0.8 inch wide \$1.12½ each.
  - 0.6 inch or less wide \$1.35 each.
- (3) Any of the foregoing having more than 7 jewels shall be subject to an additional duty of \$0.13½ for each jewel in excess of 7.
- (4) Any of the foregoing shall be subject for each adjustment of whatever kind (treating adjustment to temperature as 2 adjustments) in accordance with the marking as provided for in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 367, Tariff Act of 1930, to an additional duty of \$0.50 for each adjustment.
- (5) Any of the foregoing, if constructed or designed to operate for a period in excess of 47 hours without rewinding, or if self-winding, or if a self-winding device may be incorporated therein, shall be subject to an additional duty of \$0.75 each.

*Provided*, That this item 367 (a) shall not apply to any movement, mechanism, device, or instrument which contains less than 7 jewels if such movement, mechanism, device, or instrument contains a bushing or its equivalent (other than a substitute for a jewel) in any position customarily occupied by a jewel: *And provided further*, That any of the foregoing articles exported to the United States on or before July 27, 1954, and there entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption before the close of business August 26, 1954, shall be subject to duty at the rates which were in effect for such articles on July 1, 1954.

(b) That, until the President otherwise proclaims, the rates of duty specified in such modified item 367 (a) as set forth in paragraph (a) above shall be applied to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption which are exported to the United States after the date of this proclamation, and shall be applied to articles exported to the United States on or before that date which are so entered or withdrawn after the close of business August 26, 1954.

The said proclamation of January 9, 1936, as supplemented, is modified accordingly.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-seventh day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventh-ninth.

*John Foster Dulles*

By the President:  
JOHN FOSTER DULLES  
Secretary of State.

## Cuba Requests Renegotiation of Tariff Concession on Steel

Press release 439 dated August 13

The Government of Cuba has requested renegotiation of the concession granted the United States on steel reinforcing bars in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947. The Contracting Parties to that agreement, including the United States, have agreed to this renegotiation, in accordance with the understanding reached by the Contracting Parties at their eighth session that they would give sympathetic consideration to requests for renegotiation under exceptional circumstances.

The purpose of the Cuban Government in requesting the renegotiation is to obtain a modification in the concession which it granted on "rolled steel rods, plain or corrugated for construction purposes," that is, steel reinforcing bars, under item 36-B of Part II of the Cuban Schedule IX of the General Agreement. Item 36-B covers also other products, but the renegotiation will be confined to the reinforcing bars. The rate of duty applicable to imports into Cuba of reinforcing bars from the United States is at present 0.30 pesos (\$0.30) per 100 kilograms.

In the course of the renegotiation, the United States may request compensation in the form of other concessions by Cuba in return for agreement to the modification of the concession on steel reinforcing bars. The possible compensatory concessions may include new concessions on products not now in the Cuban schedule of concessions or additional concessions on products already in such schedule. Should modifications in the schedule of Cuban tariff concessions be agreed upon during the renegotiations, they would have to receive final approval of all the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement.

Interested persons may submit any views with regard to the steel reinforcing bars to the Committee for Reciprocity Information, which is the interdepartmental committee established to receive views on trade agreement matters. In addition to views on this product, views are also invited regarding any Cuban products on which new or



additional concessions might be requested as compensation for any agreed modification.

It is requested that any such views be submitted by the close of business on September 13, 1954. All communications on these matters, in 11 copies, should be addressed to: The Secretary of the Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D. C.

## Legislative Authority for Pacific Fisheries Commission

Press release 440 dated August 13

The President on August 12, 1954, signed S. 3713, a bill to give effect to the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean (United States, Canada and Japan), which came into force June 12, 1953.<sup>1</sup> The new law provides additional legislative authority for the operations of the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission which was established under the terms of the convention.

The U.S. Section of the Commission, as appointed by the President, has the following members:

Edward W. Allen, Attorney, of Seattle, Wash.  
Milton E. Brooding, Director of Industry Relations, California Packing Corporation, San Francisco, Calif.  
John E. Farley, Director of Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior  
B. Frank Heintzleman, Governor of Alaska

The North Pacific Fisheries Commission held its first meeting in Washington beginning February 1, 1954, at which time it completed its organization. Two permanent standing committees were established, as members of which the U.S. Section selected:

### *Committee on Biology and Research*

Edward W. Allen, Chairman  
W. F. Thompson, Director, Fisheries Research Institute, Seattle, Wash.  
Lionel A. Walford, Chief, Branch of Fishery Biology, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

### *Committee on Finance and Administration*

John L. Farley, Chairman  
Montgomery Phister, Vice President, Van Camp Sea Food Company, Terminal Island, Calif.

In accordance with the terms of the act which became law on August 12, the U.S. Section has appointed an Advisory Committee composed of persons from the various groups participating in the fisheries covered by the convention and from the fishery agencies of the states or territories the representatives of which maintain a substantial fishery in the convention area. Members of the Advisory Committee are:

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 3, 1952, p. 343, and May 26, 1952, p. 830, footnote 1.

C. L. Anderson, Director, Alaska Department of Fisheries  
W. C. Arnold, Managing Director, Alaska Salmon Industry, Inc., Seattle, Wash.  
Vernon E. Brock, Director, Division of Fish and Game, Territory of Hawaii  
Harold F. Cary, General Manager, American Tunaboat Association, San Diego, Calif.  
Richard S. Croker, Chief, Marine Fisheries Branch, State of California Department of Fish and Game  
Larry Fitzpatrick, boat owner, Juneau, Alaska  
Miller Freeman, President, Miller Freeman Publications, Seattle, Wash.  
M. T. Hoy, Oregon State Fisheries Director, Fish Commission of Oregon  
George Johansen, Secretary-Treasurer, Alaska Fisherman's Union, Seattle, Wash.  
Robert C. Kallenberg, fisherman, Dillingham, Alaska  
Donald P. Loker, Vice President, Star-Kist Foods, Inc., Terminal Island, Calif.  
Harold E. Lokken, Manager, Fishing Vessel Owners Association, Seattle, Wash.  
T. F. Sandoz, President, Columbia River Packers Association Inc., Astoria, Oreg.  
Robert J. Schoettler, Director, State of Washington, Department of Fisheries  
Lowell Wakefield, President, Wakefield's Deep Sea Trawlers Inc., Seattle, Wash.  
James Waugh, President, Cannery Workers Union of the Pacific, Terminal Island, Calif.

## Current U. N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography<sup>1</sup>

### Trusteeship Council

Provisional Agenda for the Fourteenth Session of the Trusteeship Council to be convened at United Nations Headquarters on Wednesday, 2 June 1954, at 11 a. m. T/1115. April 26, 1954. 14 pp. mimeo.

Examination of the Annual Report on the Administration of the Trust Territory of Somaliland Under Italian Administration. T/1116. April 27, 1954. 49 pp. mimeo.

Conditions in the Trust Territory of the Cameroons Under British Administration. Summary of the observations made by individual members of the Council during the general discussion, and of the comments of the representative and special representative of the Administering Authority. T/L.424, March 5, 1954. 33 pp. mimeo.

Conditions in the Trust Territory of the Cameroons Under French Administration. Report of the Drafting Committee. T/L.429, March 8, 1954. 10 pp. mimeo.

Conditions in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi. Report of the Drafting Committee. T/L.452, March 19, 1954. 9 pp. mimeo.

Conditions in the Trust Territory of Tanganyika. Summary of observations made by individual members of the Council during the general discussion and of the comments of the special representative of the Administering Authority. T/L.456, March 22, 1954. 56 pp. mimeo.

<sup>1</sup> Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

## The United Nations in Today's World

by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.  
U.S. Representative to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

We Legionnaires, who have seen war at firsthand, look at the present disordered state of the world with experienced—and anxious—eyes. When I talk about the United Nations to you today, therefore, I talk about the world situation in which the United States finds itself, for the very good reason that one cannot talk of one without talking of the other.

You know already that the United Nations has not equalled the extravagant things which were claimed for it in 1946. It was launched then on the assumption that the Soviet Union would be a peace-loving nation and a dependable ally of the United States—an assumption which was soon proved to be so wholly and so tragically erroneous.

We have since learned that to prevent war it is not enough for a group of lawyers to draft a charter, for the charter to be ratified by national legislatures, and for a building to be erected on the East River. The United Nations thus has not become an automatic peace producer. We in the Legion could have told them in 1946 that there is no such thing as an automatic peace producer and that the success of any international device depends on the extent to which the members support it when the going gets rough.

If such a device is as automatic as a burglar alarm, it is doing well. What happens after the bell rings is up to the members.

As a matter of fact, the United Nations has accomplished a number of very good things in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union has been abusing its veto power and all its other privileges in a shocking, cynical, and, in many ways, criminal manner.

It is thanks to the United Nations that the Soviet encroachment in Iran was stopped in 1946; that the United States initiative to stop Communist encroachment on Greece in 1947 was backed by indispensable international moral pressure;

that open warfare over Kashmir between India and Pakistan was stopped; that the advent of Israel into the family of nations was accomplished and an end put to a bloody war in the Holy Land; that working with the Netherlands and the Indonesians full independence was given to the 76 million people inhabiting Indonesia; and, above all, that part of the free world was organized to repel the bloody aggression in Korea, which threatened the whole free world—and not only Asia.

### The U.N. in Korea

And please note in connection with Korea that while, of course, the United States made the great and indispensable effort, without which military action would have been impossible, the other United Nations members did contribute the equivalent of two divisions and that two United States divisions at World War II figures cost \$600 million a year. The cost today is probably greater, but it is a secret. If, therefore, the United States had had to furnish these two divisions, the added dollar cost would have been at least \$600 million dollars—which, when compared with our annual contribution of \$25 million to the United Nations, is not such a bad deal.

Of far larger meaning to us are the casualties which were sustained by the men of the United Nations troops which would otherwise have been borne to a great degree by United States troops.

While we are on that subject, don't overlook the fact that, if United States policy at the time of Korea had not required nations having valuable manpower to reimburse us in dollars for the supplies which we provided them, we might have had a substantially larger contribution of manpower from United Nations members. My personal opinion is that there might have been at least three more divisions, making a total of five United Nations divisions, exclusive of the United States, instead of two.

But, naturally, nations which had no mecha-

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the Iowa Department of the American Legion at Des Moines, Iowa, on Aug. 2 (U.S./U.N. press release 1943 dated July 30).



nized equipment, which had no shipping, and which had no dollars, could not promise to supply equipment, shipping, and dollars which they did not possess. And United States policy at that time would not accept troops from nations which would not make such a promise. This naturally had the effect of reducing the foreign troop contribution. As military men yourselves, you can see the importance of our having to supply our own men to make good the difference.

This, of course, was a reversal of the policy of World War II. Let me assure you that is an error which will not be repeated.

So much for the United Nations troop contribution.

Now, as to personnel, let me say that in a few weeks every single American employed at the United Nations will have been screened in accordance with Civil Service Commission and FBI procedures—and for the good and sufficient reason that with so many good Americans to choose from there is absolutely no excuse for employing one single American Communist at the United Nations. Already all important positions out of the 1,800 total have been screened.

As to costs, I am glad to report that last year the size of the American contribution was reduced both in percentage and in dollars—and the Russian share was increased.

Then, the United Nations gives us a chance to reveal the truth about the Soviet Communists and the Chinese Communists—which we have done repeatedly. One of the most effective presentations was made by your near neighbor, Dr. Charles Mayo of Rochester, Minn., who held the floor and the front pages of the world for 10 days exposing the ghastly lie of the Chinese Communists that American aviators in Korea had used germ warfare.

I follow the invariable rule of always speaking on the day that a Communist speaks so that in the very same news story the side of the United States of America will go out all over the world.

#### The Guatemala Question

One of the most important occurrences at the United Nations was in June when the Soviet Union, working hand-in-glove with the Arbenz regime in Guatemala, tried to use the United Nations to promote its effort to penetrate Latin America. They wanted to use the Security Council, not to settle the problem, but to torpedo the Organization of American States; to divert world attention from the dangerous degree of Communist penetration in Guatemala; and to send so-called "peace observers" to the area, among whom would have been Communist agents. It was thus hoped to take over not only Guatemala but the surrounding area.

Judging by the bitterness of the attacks which were made on me by the Communist *Daily Worker*,

which is published in New York, and the Russian newspapers, notably *Pravda*, they didn't like our attitude. They just about called me every name in the dictionary, and, believe me, coming from that quarter I consider it a compliment.

As it turned out, the Inter-American System dealt with the problem most efficaciously. The United States went right to work to prevent the Soviets and their sympathizers from using the United Nations to destroy the Organization of American States—an organization the inspiration of which goes back to the Monroe Doctrine. The Communist attempt to disguise their efforts to establish a Communist base in this hemisphere under cover of United Nations deliberation and debate was decisively defeated. This defeat in the Security Council so discouraged Communists elsewhere that they gave up hope of subverting Guatemala. Thus a dangerous attack was turned into a positive advantage.

We can derive satisfaction from this particular decisive victory over Soviet Communist imperialism. But the worldwide struggle never ceases.

Now we have those who urge the admission of the Chinese Communists to the United Nations. Note well that those who favor admitting the Chinese Communists base their argument on grounds of expediency—and for the very simple reason that they cannot base it on principle or good international morals. Look at the facts:

The Soviet Union has prevented such peaceful nations as Ireland, Finland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ceylon, and South Korea from being admitted. But it wants the United Nations to admit the group which has been legally declared by the United Nations itself to be the aggressor in Korea—Korea, where occurred the largest and most important aggression with which the United Nations has had to deal since its creation.

No peace has been reached in Korea. The Chinese Communists showed at Geneva that they want no peace there. The Chinese Communist Army is there in flagrant aggression at this moment. They are at war with the United Nations. They have the blood of hundreds of thousands of persons on their hands, including 140,000 American casualties, and our American prisoners who have been killed in cold blood.

And only last week they added to this death toll the names of innocent persons, some of them women and children, in an air attack on a commercial passenger plane which horrified the whole civilized world and provides still another reason—though none was needed—to prove the unfitness of the China Reds to sit in the United Nations. The firm and rapid action of the President in sending planes and ships of the United States to the scene for a humanitarian purpose is in the best American tradition.

Yet, with the blood still wet on their hands, they, of all nations, are to be singled out to become members of this society of—and I quote from the

charter—"peace-loving" nations. And, let it be added, a society which they denounce and the rules of which they say they will not obey.

Maybe it is not very subtle or very sophisticated to say so, but it seems indisputable that either one is really in favor of collective security or one is not.

Many of us can well remember World War I, when the United States was not in favor of collective security, when we declared our neutrality and tried to stay out of the conflict. We were at that time implored by other nations to support the idea of collective security against aggression, and we joined the conflict.

We can all remember World War II. At that time the United States again was not committed to the idea of collective security. We believed in neutrality. We tried to stay out of the conflict. But we were urged again to defend the principle of collective security, and we joined the conflict.

Today, fellow members of the Legion, the United States *believes* in collective security, and our belief in it is not merely a matter of lipservice and of words. When the aggression occurred in Korea, we stepped up and made our contribution. In our simple way, we thought that aggression was wrong; that the charter meant what it said; that the success of Communist aggression would endanger the free world; and that the only good future for the United Nations lay in its members, having the courage to support it when the going was rough.

In the face of this record, one cannot escape the conclusion that to admit the Chinese Communists before there is a peace in Korea is an insult to the entire principle of collective security which we in the United Nations are sworn to uphold as well as being an affront to the memory of our dead. It would be proof that we did not mean what we said when we solemnly declared our hatred of aggression. To admit this regime, which uses war as an instrument of national policy, is to steer the United Nations onto a rock on which it will founder.

#### The Challenge to Free Men

There are those who think that the United Nations can succeed by paying lipservice to the ideal of making real sacrifices when an aggression occurs—that the United Nations can survive by taking the *negatively pernicious* course of sitting idly by, of being mere cynical free-riders and fair-weather sailors.

Then there are those who go even further and declare in effect that the United Nations can succeed by taking the *positively pernicious* course of disregarding the charter and openly embracing the aggressor.

Both are tragically mistaken.

We must follow the inspiring lead which the

United Nations gave the world in its collective action against aggression in Korea.

It is up to United Nations members to decide whether the United Nations is to become a place for mere discredited talk or for purposeful and inspiring action. It will be a bitter day for humanity when the United Nations becomes a mere sordid cockpit of power politics in which the criminal and the lawabiding are scrambled up indiscriminately. Destroy the moral sanction of the United Nations and you have killed one of man's noblest aspirations.

Watching the Soviet Communists every day at the United Nations and studying their tactics throughout the world, I have reached one conclusion, which is that they believe in the axiom: "Never hit a man until he's down." When they think you are down or about to fall, that's when they jump on you. It is up to us, therefore, and for all other free men who want to keep their freedom, to keep strong; to keep standing; to keep moving ahead; to keep our confidence; to be optimistic—always to remember that long faces win no battles.

It is in this spirit that in these recent weeks we have seen the firm and efficacious attitude of our own Government as regards the Communist plot against Guatemala, the admission of Red China to the United Nations, and the humanitarian dispatch of United States ships and planes to Far Eastern waters. We should welcome such policies because they are the best guaranty of peace.

There is no organization in America—and, I believe, no organization in the world—which better exemplifies these traits than the American Legion. You have the responsibility to exalt those manly qualities and keep them ever before our people. You have thus the opportunity to keep our country strong in this time of peril.

#### Meeting the Economic Needs of Underdeveloped Countries

*Statement by Preston Hotchkis  
U.S. Representative on ECOSOC<sup>1</sup>*

I have never listened more closely and intently to a debate before this Council since I have had the honor to represent my country in this body than I have to this one on a proposed Special Development Fund.

I have listened intently because:

1. I have a very high regard for what my colleagues in this Council say and think;

<sup>1</sup> Made in the U.N. Economic and Social Council at Geneva on July 22 (U.S./U.N. press release 1946 dated Aug. 5).



2. I am confident that their statements represent their sincere judgment; and

3. This forum is a place where on the anvil of debate are fashioned some shapes and forms which affect the future of great portions of the world. For, truly, what we say here is soon forgotten, but what we do here may be felt by the world for generations to come.

In this debate on SUNFED [Special U.N. Fund for Economic Development] I have been mindful of a certain enthusiasm on the part of my colleagues on the Council and other speakers. That is quite understandable, and it probably accounts for some statements with which I could hardly agree but which, in the good spirit pervading this whole discussion, I would put down as having been made in the enthusiasm of the moment.

I have also observed another thing—a sort of division and association on the part of countries which regard themselves as underdeveloped, as against so-called industrialized or more developed countries. This division seems to run increasingly through every discussion in this Council, in its committees, its commissions, and, in fact, in all the organs of the United Nations. It is in technical assistance, the International Bank report, the international trade discussions, and in the present debate on the Special Development Fund.

Now, I submit this is a *United Nations*, not a *Divided Nations*, and each of us here in this chamber and the other members of the United Nations have a solemn duty to keep it united—to make the United Nations Charter a pulsating code of unity.

My own country is underdeveloped in many important areas. We have hundreds of millions of acres of undeveloped land; we have tens of millions in kilowatts of undeveloped electrical energy; we have countless millions of tons of undeveloped minerals we have tens of thousands of miles of unbuilt or underbuilt roads or highways; and we have a limited poverty problem among some of our people.

Hence, in a sense we are underdeveloped, and only 50 or 60 years ago we were underdeveloped. At that time agriculture was our predominant occupation. We had very little industry, and the production of natural resources was not large.

How in that short time did we effect the transition? First, by creating a favorable climate for the investment of private foreign capital. Second, by creating opportunity for our own citizens under the incentive of the free-enterprise system to create, build, and to develop industries. Third, by keeping a stable government and stable finances. Fourth, by working like beavers.

For, in those years, there was no international organization of nations to which we could turn if we had wanted to do so. Our development and diversification came partly from private foreign capital, but mostly from within our own country—by unlocking the energy inherent in all peoples

everywhere to improve their own lot—through the system of free competitive enterprise.

I shall confine my remarks to the question of a Special Development Fund. Statements by my delegation on the remaining topics under this item will be made in the Economic Committee.

#### General Assembly Action

At the last session of the General Assembly member nations declared themselves ready to ask their peoples, when sufficient progress has been made in internationally supervised worldwide disarmament, to devote a portion of the savings from such disarmament to an international fund to assist development and reconstruction in the underdeveloped countries.<sup>2</sup> We now have before us the official statements of numerous governments as to the degree of support they would be prepared to give to the establishment of an international development fund. We also have the useful summary of these statements submitted by Mr. Scheyven<sup>3</sup> in his Interim Report, Document E/2599.

Most of the speakers to whom I have listened during this discussion have stated a position which, as I understand it, is substantially as follows: It is undesirable to wait until progress in internationally supervised disarmament makes it possible for member countries to give effect to the declaration embodied in the General Assembly resolution. The proposed Special Fund, considered by the Committee of Experts, is vitally needed to promote the economic progress of the underdeveloped countries. It would also contribute to the achievement of peace and security in the world. The fund should therefore be established at an early date. All that is needed to make its establishment possible is the sum of \$250 million. This is an insignificant amount compared with what is currently being spent around the world for armaments, and it could easily be provided as moderate cuts are made in the level of armament expenditures.

I believe, Mr. President, that my summary is a fair one. In the view of my delegation this line of argument, by focusing on the \$250 million, loses all sense of perspective. How little this could provide for each of the underdeveloped countries that would feel entitled to a share of it. The sum of \$250 million was, in fact, proposed by the Committee of Experts only as the minimum amount which they believed needed to be assured before the fund could get organized and started. It was apparent to them that, unless the fund could be supported by continuing contributions aggregat-

<sup>2</sup> For text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Dec. 14, 1953, p. 839.

<sup>3</sup> Raymond Scheyven of Belgium, president of the sixteenth session of Ecosoc, was appointed by the Eighth General Assembly to examine and report on the comments of governments; see U.N. doc 724 B (VIII).

ing many times this \$250 million, it would be unable to operate successfully and could accomplish little toward the promotion of economic development.

Surely it would be unwise, as well as premature, to launch a Special Fund to undertake an enormous global task before there was any reasonable prospect that the huge resources such a fund would need for this task would be forthcoming. It would be comparable to a man making a downpayment on the purchase of a house or a farm without feeling reasonably sure that the money for future payments would become available. Establishment of a fund under these conditions could only engender in the underdeveloped countries feelings of disappointment, disillusionment, and frustration.

While it is clear that a fund could do relatively little with \$250 million, it is extremely doubtful whether, at this time, even this modest sum could be secured under the conditions prescribed by the experts. The experts recognized that a fund would have to be a truly international one. They recommended therefore that a fund should not be set up at all unless the requisite initial contributions were pledged by at least 30 governments. In the view of my delegation, Mr. President, the striking fact revealed by the replies of governments is not that they give evidence of any substantial support for the early establishment of a Special Fund, but rather that they indicate how small the prospective support really is.

I have emphasized, Mr. President, that a Special Fund could have no hope of success unless it was able under existing world conditions to secure for its continuing operation sums vastly greater than the \$250 million which would be required for its initial establishment. Does anyone around this table seriously believe that such sums would be forthcoming? I doubt it, Mr. President. We must bear in mind that it would be of no advantage to the underdeveloped countries if resources were secured for the operation of a Special Fund merely by diverting them from existing programs of economic development. As long as world tension continues, the total burden of taxation on the people of the United States for armaments and for other purposes, including the reconstruction of areas devastated by Communist aggression, is certain to remain large. Any savings from disarmament will have many claims for its use, and every competing claim will have to be examined with the utmost caution. In so doing we may be sure that claims pertaining to the welfare of the underdeveloped countries will continue to receive, as they have received in the past, the most earnest consideration. There is, however, little likelihood that our people will feel disposed at this time to accept heavy additional financial commitments that are not necessitated by the most vital and urgent requirements of national security. Under

these circumstances my government sees no useful purpose which could be served by the creation of a new international agency which would be unlikely to result in any net increase of assistance to underdeveloped areas.

Does this mean that we fail to recognize the sense of urgency felt by underdeveloped countries faced with the necessity for improving the conditions under which their people are struggling for survival? Does this mean that the underdeveloped countries must reconcile themselves to a situation where they can expect little assistance from the more developed countries? The answer to these questions is clearly "No!" This is substantiated by a long and continuing record.

#### Existing Aid Programs

Aid for the economic development of the underdeveloped countries is currently being extended by many of the more developed member states and in many forms. We have already heard from the representatives of Belgium and France as to what their countries are doing in this direction. We may hear from the representative of the United Kingdom something of what the Commonwealth countries are doing under the Colombo Plan and other programs. The efforts of my own country in this direction have often been indicated in this forum. Since World War II, in addition to the vast sums we in the United States have expended for relief and reconstruction and for helping to maintain peace and security in the free world against the threat of Communist aggression, we have devoted to the economic assistance of underdeveloped countries over \$6 billion. In other words, my country alone has provided for this purpose more than 25 times the \$250 million that it is now proposed the world should contribute collectively for the establishment of a Special Fund.

Under these circumstances my delegation is unable to subscribe to the second recommendation of the draft resolution presented by Yugoslavia,<sup>4</sup> which calls upon governments to contribute to a Special Fund a portion of the savings achieved through the reduction of defense expenditure. Nor can my delegation support the draft resolution presented by Pakistan<sup>5</sup> which calls for the early establishment of a Special Fund.

I began, Mr. President, by referring to the pledge embodied in the General Assembly resolution. We reaffirm that pledge. In the period ahead the United States Government will continue to exert every effort toward a relaxation of international tensions which will pave the way for worldwide disarmament. In the meantime, postponement of the establishment of a new international development fund need not hinder progress toward

<sup>4</sup>U.N. doc. E/L. 620.

<sup>5</sup>U.N. doc. E/L. 621.

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development. There are many national and international agencies now functioning whose purpose is to help the underdeveloped countries accelerate their economic growth. The absence of a new international fund does not mean the absence of any machinery for this task, nor does it preclude assistance from countries that feel able to make contributions to this end. For its part, as I have tried to make clear, the United States has done and is doing much to promote economic development.

There is every evidence that the aid that has been extended to underdeveloped countries, both on a bilateral and multilateral basis, has been of considerable benefit to them. It has helped to stimulate latent energies and has strengthened their ability to make the best use of their own resources. We are proud that the United States has had so large a share in this constructive work.

The countries of the free world know well where the responsibility for the present international tension really lies. They are aware of the efforts my country has made, the most recent one only 2 months ago,<sup>6</sup> in company with our principal allies to reach an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on some form of internationally supervised worldwide disarmament. We stand ready at all times to reenter negotiations for such an agreement, whenever the U.S.S.R. makes their resumption possible.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Customs Tariff

Protocol modifying the convention signed at Brussels July 5, 1890 (26 Stat. 1518), relating to the creation of an International Union for Publication of Customs Tariffs. Done at Brussels December 16, 1949. Entered into force May 5, 1950.<sup>7</sup>

*Adherence deposited:* U.S.S.R., June 22, 1954.

##### Drugs

Protocol for termination of Brussels Agreement for unification of pharmacopoeial formulas for potent drugs. Signed at Geneva May 20, 1952. Entered into force May 20, 1952. TIAS 2692.

*Notification by Germany of application to:* Berlin, June 22, 1954.

<sup>6</sup>For a U.S. statement on the disarmament talks held at London May 13-June 22, see BULLETIN of Aug. 2, 1954, p. 171.

<sup>7</sup>Not in force for the United States.

#### Postal Matters

Universal postal convention, with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution; and provisions regarding air-mail and final protocol thereto. Signed at Brussels July 11, 1952. Entered into force July 1, 1953. TIAS 2800.

*Ratifications deposited:* France, including Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and all overseas territories of the French Republic and territories administered as such, June 25, 1954.

#### Shipping

International load line convention. Signed at London July 5, 1930. Entered into force January 1, 1933. 47 Stat. 2228.

*Accession deposited:* Korea, June 11, 1954.

#### Slave Trade

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926, and Annex (46 Stat. 2183). Done at New York December 7, 1953.<sup>7</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Austria, July 16, 1954.

#### Trade and Commerce

Second protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 1700). Done at Geneva November 8, 1952.<sup>8</sup>

*Signature:* Cuba, May 27, 1954.

Third protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 1700). Done at Geneva October 24, 1953.<sup>8</sup>

*Signature:* Cuba, May 27, 1954.

### BILATERAL

#### Brazil

Agreement extending the agreement providing for a cooperative program of industrial apprenticeship dated June 30, 1952, as extended (TIAS 2748 and 2839). Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro June 2 and 30, 1954. Entered into force June 30, 1954.

#### Haiti

Agreement for a cooperative program of rural education in Haiti, pursuant to the General Agreement for Technical Cooperation dated May 2, 1951 (TIAS 2414). Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince May 28, 1954. Entered into force May 28, 1954.

#### Mexico

Agreement for survey of Mexico's technical education activities and needs, pursuant to the technical cooperation agreement dated June 27, 1951 (TIAS 2273), as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico June 7, 1954. Entered into force June 7, 1954.

#### Philippines

Agreement amending the agreement of November 18 and December 13, 1952 (TIAS 2931), relating to recruiting Philippine citizens for voluntary enlistment into the United States Navy. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila April 1 and June 21, 1954, with a related exchange of notes at Manila of July 20 and 30, 1954. Entered into force June 21, 1954.

<sup>8</sup>Not in force.

## Senate Passes Resolution on German Sovereignty

*Following is the text of Senate Resolution 295, which was approved on July 30:*

Whereas a convention on relations between the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, therein referred to as the "Three Powers," and the Federal Republic of Germany, was signed on May 26, 1952, with a view to restoring sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany; and

Whereas the Senate of the United States gave its advice and consent to ratification of said convention on July 1, 1952; and

Whereas, nevertheless, it has not proved practical as yet to bring the Convention into force in accordance with its provisions: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President, if he judges that future developments make this desirable and in the national interest, should take such steps as he deems appropriate and as are consistent with United States constitutional processes to restore sovereignty to Germany and to enable her to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

## Current Legislation on Foreign Policy: 83d Congress, 2d Session

Review of the United Nations Charter. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Proposals To Amend or Otherwise Modify Existing International Peace and Security Organizations, Including the United Nations. Part 4, Greensboro, N. C., May 15, 1954. 145 pp.

Antarctic Expedition. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on S. 3381, a Bill To Authorize the President To Provide Assistance to an Expedition to the Antarctic in Furtherance of the Interests of the United States. July 1, 1954. 27 pp.

Implementing International Convention for High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 3713, a Bill To Give Effect to the International Convention for

the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, Signed at Tokyo, May 9, 1952, and for Other Purposes. July 12, 1954. 18 pp.

To Amend the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. R. 9910, To Amend Section 413 (b) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. July 14, 1954. 47 pp.

Mutual Security Appropriations for 1955. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations. July 7-17, 1954. 562 pp.

Special Study Mission to Latin America on Technical Cooperation. Report by Hon. Donald L. Jackson, California, Chairman, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, pursuant to H. Res. 113, a Resolution Authorizing the Committee on Foreign Affairs To Conduct Thorough Studies and Investigations of All Matters Coming Within the Jurisdiction of Such Committee. H. Rept. 2442, July 22, 1954. 143 pp.

Trading With the Enemy Act. Report to accompany S. 3423. S. Rept. 1982, July 24, 1954. 23 pp.

Notification by the Netherlands Government with Respect to the Netherlands Antilles. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Notification Embodied in a Note from the Netherlands Ambassador in Washington to the Secretary of State, Dated June 24, 1952, with a View to Extending the Operation of the Convention of April 29, 1948, Respecting Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes, to the Netherlands Antilles, with Certain Limitations by the Netherlands Government. Executive I, July 24, 1954. 6 pp.

Proposed Supplemental Appropriations, Department of State. Communication from the President of the United States Transmitting a Proposed Supplemental Appropriation for the Fiscal Year 1955, Department of State, Amounting to \$900,000. S. Doc. 147, July 26, 1954. 2 pp.

Tariff Reclassification of Dictophones. Report to accompany H. R. 8932. S. Rept. 1984, July 26, 1954. 4 pp.

Extending Greetings to the Gold Coast and Nigeria. Report to accompany H. Res. 648. H. Rept. 2497, July 26, 1954. 2 pp.

Federal Republic of Germany. Report to accompany H. R. 9988. H. Rept. 2498, July 26, 1954. 3 pp.

Providing for the Pro Rata Sharing of the Cost of Certain Claims with Foreign Nations. Report to accompany H. R. 8684. H. Rept. 2523, July 26, 1954. 17 pp.

The Pan American Institute of Geography and History. Report to accompany H. J. Res. 565. H. Rept. 2524, July 26, 1954. 11 pp.

Restoring Sovereignty to Germany. Report to accompany S. Res. 295. S. Rept. 1991, July 28, 1954. 4 pp.

Authorizing Relief of Authorized Certifying Officers From Exceptions Taken to Payments Pertaining to Terminated War Agencies in Liquidation by the Department of State. Report to accompany S. 1184. H. Rept. 2562, July 28, 1954. 4 pp.

Convention on Double Taxation with the Federal Republic of Germany. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Convention Between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, Signed in the English and German Languages at Washington on July 22, 1954. Executive J, July 29, 1954. 15 pp.

Supplemental Appropriation—Funds Appropriated to the President. Communication from the President of the United States Transmitting a Proposed Supplemental Appropriation for Fiscal Year 1955, Amounting to \$5,000,000 for Funds Appropriated to the President. S. Doc. 150, July 29, 1954. 2 pp.

Trading with the Enemy Act. Minority Views to accompany S. 3423. S. Rept. 1982, Part 2, July 29, 1954. 6 pp.

Amending Section 22 of the Organic Act of Guam.



Report to accompany H. R. 8634. S. Rept. 2006, July 29, 1954. 11 pp.

Twelfth Semiannual Report on Educational Exchange Activities. Letter from Chairman, United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange Transmitting the Twelfth Semiannual Report by the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange for the Period January 1 to June 30, 1954, pursuant to Section 603 of Public Law 402, 80th Congress. H. Doc. 483, July 29, 1954. 7 pp.

Relief and Rehabilitation in Korea. Twenty-third Intermediate Report of the House Committee on Government Operations. H. Rept. 2574, July 29, 1954. 75 pp.

Authorizing the Erection of a Memorial Gift from the People of the Netherlands. Report to accompany H. J. Res. 356. S. Rept. 2019, July 30, 1954. 4 pp.

Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1955. Report to accompany H. R. 9936. S. Rept. 2034, July 31, 1954. 79 pp.

The Contribution of Atomic Energy to Medicine. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. June 2-4, 1954. 194 pp.

Review of the United Nations Charter. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Proposals To Amend or Otherwise Modify Existing International Peace and Security Organizations, Including the United Nations. Part 5, Louisville, Ky., June 7, 1954. 106 pp.

Extending Certain Rights and Benefits to Coast and Geodetic Survey Officers Serving in Military Hazard Areas. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 2389, a Bill To Amend the Act of December 3, 1942. July 6, 1954. 8 pp.

Restrictions on the Admission of Cattle and Poultry into the Virgin Islands. Report to accompany S. 3800. S. Rept. 2042, August 2, 1954. 3 pp.

Amending the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. Report to accompany H. R. 8193. S. Rept. 2045, August 2, 1954. 9 pp.

Amending the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act. Report to accompany S. 3585. S. Rept. 2195, August 2, 1954. 7 pp.

Published Articles and Broadcasts by Foreign Agents. Report to accompany S. 521. S. Rept. 2200, August 2, 1954. 3 pp.

Joint Congressional Committee on Tin. Report to accompany H. Con. Res. 259. S. Rept. 2208, August 3, 1954. 3 pp.

Amending the Copyright Law in Implementation of the Universal Copyright Convention. Report to accompany H. R. 6616. H. Rept. 2608, August 3, 1954. 10 pp.

Protecting the Rights of Vessels of the United States on the High Seas and in Territorial Waters of Foreign Countries. Report to accompany H. R. 9584. S. Rept. 2214, August 4, 1954. 7 pp.

Amending the War Claims Act To Confer Benefits on Certain American Citizens Interned or Held Prisoners of War During the Hostilities in Korea. Report to accompany H. R. 9390. S. Rept. 2248, August 5, 1954. 7 pp.

Granting of Permanent Residence to Certain Aliens. Report to accompany H. Con. Res. 254. S. Rept. 2252, August 5, 1954. 2 pp.

Mutual Security Act of 1954. Conference Report to accompany H. R. 9678. H. Rept. 2637, August 5, 1954. 48 pp.

Double Taxation Conventions with Japan and the United Kingdom. Report to accompany Executive D, 83d Cong., 2d sess.; Executive E, 83d Cong., 2d sess.; and Executive H, 83d Cong., 2d sess. S. Exec. Rept. 6, August 6, 1954. 10 pp.

Mutual Security Appropriation Bill, 1955. Report to accompany H. R. 10051. S. Rept. 2268, August 6, 1954. 22 pp.

Providing for the Joint Committee on Tin. Report to ac-

company H. Con. Res. 259. S. Rept. 2315, August 6, 1954. 3 pp.

Pro Rata Sharing of Certain Foreign Claims. Report to accompany S. 3844. S. Rept. 2324, August 6, 1954. 4 pp.

Customs Simplification Act of 1954. Report to accompany H. R. 10009. S. Rept. 2326, August 6, 1954. 16 pp.

The Pan American Institute of Geography and History. Report to accompany H. J. Res. 565. S. Rept. 2327, August 6, 1954. 4 pp.

Greetings Extended to the Gold Coast and Nigeria. Report to accompany S. J. Res. 183. S. Rept. 2328, August 6, 1954. 2 pp.

Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Conference Report to accompany H. R. 9757. H. Rept. 2639, August 6, 1954. 49 pp.

Requiring International Agreements Other Than Treaties To Be Transmitted to the Senate Within 60 Days After Execution Thereof. Report to accompany S. 3067, as amended. S. Rept. 2340, August 7, 1954. 3 pp.

Disposition of Seamen's Effects. Report to accompany S. 2017. S. Rept. 2350, August 7, 1954. 10 pp.

Declaring the Customs Court To Be a Constitutional Court. Report to accompany S. 2975. S. Rept. 2352, August 7, 1954. 4 pp.

Declaring the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals a Constitutional Court. Report to accompany S. 3131. S. Rept. 2353, August 7, 1954. 7 pp.

Amendments to the Bill (S. 1766) Entitled "An Act To Establish the Office of Commissioner of Refugees." Report to accompany amendments to the bill S. 1766. S. Rept. 2356, August 9, 1954. 2 pp.

Claims of Former Prisoners of War. Report to accompany S. 221. S. Rept. 2361, August 9, 1954. 5 pp.

Report of the Select Committee To Investigate Communist Aggression Against Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, East Germany, Russia and the Non-Russian Nations of the U.S.S.R. Second Interim Report of the House Select Committee on Communist Aggression. H. Rept. 2650, August 9, 1954. 25 pp.

Preventing Entry of Livestock and Poultry Diseases into the Virgin Islands. Report to accompany H. R. 10077. H. Rept. 2653, August 10, 1954. 3 pp.

## THE DEPARTMENT

### Functions and Authorities of Department Officers<sup>1</sup>

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of State by sections 3 and 4 of Public Law 73, 81st Congress, approved May 26, 1949 (63 Stat. 111), and in accordance with the requirements of section 3 (a) (1) of Public Law 404, 79th Congress, approved June 11, 1946 (60 Stat. 238), functions and authorities are hereby prescribed for the positions enumerated below. All prior delegations of authority and public notices which are inconsistent or in conflict with the functions and authorities herein prescribed are, to the extent of such inconsistencies or conflicts, hereby superseded. Nothing contained herein shall authorize the exercise of authority which by law is required to be exercised solely by the Secretary of State.

*The Under Secretary of State for Administration.*  
a. Exercises the authority vested in the Secretary of State

<sup>1</sup> Public Notice 133; 19 Fed. Reg. 5112.

by section 3 of Public Law 73, 81st Congress, to "administer, coordinate, and direct the Foreign Service of the United States and the personnel of the State Department."

b. Exercises the authority now or hereafter vested in the Secretary of State or the Department of State with respect to the administration of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

c. Provides general direction and control of the organizational structure and assignment of functions in the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

d. Provides general direction for the use of appropriated funds, for the establishment of program priorities for budgetary purposes, and the administrative implementation of approved substantive policies and programs.

e. Directs and supervises the activities of the Assistant Secretary for Personnel and Administration, the Administrator of the Bureau of Inspection, Security, and Consular Affairs and the Director General of the Foreign Service.

*Assistant Secretary of State for Personnel and Administration.* a. Develops, establishes, revises and promulgates the organizational structure and assignment of functions in the Department and the Foreign Service.

b. Directs the administration of the personnel program of the Department and the Foreign Service.

c. Establishes relative program priorities for budgetary purposes and supervises the use of appropriated funds in accordance with congressional limitations, program objectives, and policies of the President and the Secretary.

d. Directs preparation of annual budget estimates and the allocation of funds made available to the Secretary or the Department.

e. Directs the development and operation of administrative management controls including fiscal controls, reporting systems, manuals of regulations and procedures, etc., designed to promote efficient, economical, and effective operation in all areas of the Department and the Foreign Service, and to enforce compliance with established policies and instructions.

f. Directs and provides for the acquisition, maintenance and operation of buildings, grounds, and other facilities required for use in connection with the Department's operations abroad.

g. Directs and provides procurement, communication, transportation, fiscal and other administrative services.

h. Prescribes and promulgates such rules and regulations, and makes such delegations of authority as may be necessary to carry out his assigned responsibilities.

*Administrator, Bureau of Inspection, Security and Consular Affairs.* a. Provides technical direction for the consular program of the Foreign Service and directs

related work of the Department, including such activities as passport services, protection and welfare of American citizens and interests, issuance of visas, representation of interests of foreign governments, and export control of munitions.

b. Directs the security program of the Department and the Foreign Service.

c. Directs the administration of the Refugee Relief Program established by the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Public Law 203, 83d Congress (67 Stat. 400).

d. Directs the administration of the Department's domestic and foreign inspection programs.

e. Prescribes and promulgates such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out his assigned responsibilities.

Dated: AUGUST 4, 1954.

[SEAL]

JOHN FOSTER DULLES,  
Secretary of State.

## Designation

Frederick R. Carson as Deputy Director, Office of International Administration, effective August 4.

## Retirement

Robert C. Alexander, Deputy Administrator of the Refugee Relief Program, effective July 27 (press release 407).

## FOREIGN SERVICE

## Confirmation

The Senate on July 28 confirmed Arthur A. Ageton to be Ambassador to Paraguay.



**American Principles**

The "Good Partner" Policy (Dulles) . . . . .	267
The United Nations in Today's World (Lodge) . . . . .	278
Asia. Conference on Collective Security in Southeast Asia . . . . .	264
Atomic Energy. Status of Negotiations on Atomic Pool Plan (Dulles) . . . . .	273
Canada. Launching of St. Lawrence Power Project (Eisenhower) . . . . .	267
Congress, The	
Current Legislation . . . . .	284
Senate Passes Resolution on German Sovereignty . . . . .	284
Cuba. Cuba Requests Renegotiation of Tariff Concession on Steel . . . . .	276
<b>Economic Affairs</b>	
Advance Notice of Philippine Trade Negotiation Hearings . . . . .	264
Changes in Rates of Duty on Watch Movements (text of proclamation) . . . . .	274
Cuba Requests Renegotiation of Tariff Concession on Steel . . . . .	276
Disposition of German Assets (Eisenhower, Adenauer) . . . . .	269
Foreign Claims Commission . . . . .	273
Iranian Oil Settlement (Eisenhower, Pahlavi, Entezam) . . . . .	266
Launching of St. Lawrence Power Project (Eisenhower) . . . . .	267
Meeting the Economic Needs of Underdeveloped Countries (Hotchkis) . . . . .	280
Europe. Aid to Flood Areas of Eastern and Central Europe (Eisenhower, Conant) . . . . .	271
Far East. Communist Tactics in the Far East (Robertson) . . . . .	259
Foreign Service. Confirmation (Ageton) . . . . .	286
France. Building Strength Through Cooperation (Dillon) . . . . .	268
Germany	
Disposition of German Assets (Eisenhower, Adenauer) . . . . .	269
Senate Passes Resolution on German Sovereignty . . . . .	284
Indochina. Aid to Refugees in Indochina . . . . .	265
International Organizations and Meetings	
Conference on Collective Security in Southeast Asia . . . . .	264
Legislative Authority for Pacific Fisheries Commission . . . . .	277
U.S.-Philippine Council To Meet in September . . . . .	264
Iran. Iranian Oil Settlement (Eisenhower, Pahlavi, Entezam) . . . . .	266
Japan. Economic Position of Japan (Dulles) . . . . .	264
Military Affairs. U.S. Planes To Use Dutch Airbase . . . . .	269
<b>Mutual Security</b>	
Aid to Flood Areas of Eastern and Central Europe (Eisenhower, Conant) . . . . .	271
Aid to Refugees in Indochina . . . . .	265
Building Strength Through Cooperation (Dillon) . . . . .	268
Netherlands, The. U.S. Planes To Use Dutch Airbase . . . . .	269
Philippines, The	
Advance Notice of Philippine Trade Negotiation Hearings . . . . .	264
U.S.-Philippine Council To Meet in September . . . . .	264
<b>Presidential Documents</b>	
Aid to Flood Areas of Eastern and Central Europe . . . . .	271
Changes in Rates of Duty on Watch Movements . . . . .	274
Disposition of German Assets . . . . .	269
Iranian Oil Settlement . . . . .	266
Launching of St. Lawrence Power Project . . . . .	267
Legislative Authority for Pacific Fisheries Commission . . . . .	277
<b>Protection of Nationals and Property. Detention of Staff Members of U.S. Embassy at Moscow (text of U.S. note) . . . . .</b>	<b>274</b>

**Refugees and Displaced Persons**

Aid to Refugees in Indochina . . . . .	265
Yuri A. Rastvorov Granted Asylum (text of note) . . . . .	271
State, Department of	
Designation (Carson) . . . . .	286
Functions and Authorities of Department Officers . . . . .	285
Retirement (Alexander) . . . . .	286
Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . . .	283
U.S.S.R.	
Detention of Staff Members of U.S. Embassy at Moscow (text of U.S. note) . . . . .	274
Yuri A. Rastvorov Granted Asylum (text of U.S. note) . . . . .	271
United Kingdom. U.K. Grants Perpetual Rights for American Military Cemetery . . . . .	270
United Nations	
Current U.N. Documents . . . . .	277
Meeting the Economic Needs of Underdeveloped Countries (Hotchkis) . . . . .	280
The United Nations in Today's World (Lodge) . . . . .	278
<b>Name Index</b>	
Adenauer, Konrad . . . . .	269
Ageton, Arthur A. . . . .	286
Alexander, Robert C. . . . .	286
Carson, Frederick R. . . . .	286
Clay, Henry J. . . . .	273
Conant, James B. . . . .	271
Dillon, Douglas . . . . .	268
Dulles, Secretary . . . . .	264, 267, 273, 285
Eisenhower, President . . . . .	266, 267, 269, 271, 274, 277
Entezam, Abdollah . . . . .	267
Gilliland, Whitney . . . . .	273
Hasler, Arthur . . . . .	274
Hotchkis, Preston . . . . .	280
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. . . . .	278
Marshall, Joyce . . . . .	274
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza . . . . .	266
Rastvorov, Yuri A. . . . .	271
Robertson, Walter S. . . . .	259
Stassen, Harold E. . . . .	263

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 9-15

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press release issued prior to August 9 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 429 of August 6.

No.	Date	Subject
432	8/10	Dulles: Good partners.
*433	8/10	Dulles: Herbert Hoover's birthday.
434	8/10	Dulles: Atomic pool plan.
435	8/10	Dulles: Japan's economic position.
436	8/11	Hearings on Philippine trade.
*437	8/12	Gov. Murray to visit Mexico.
438	8/12	Military cemetery in England.
439	8/13	Cuban tariff concession.
440	8/13	N. Pacific fisheries legislation.
441	8/13	Rastvorov granted asylum.
†442	8/13	Lectures on atomic energy.
443	8/14	Asian security conference.
444	8/14	U.S.-Philippine Council meeting.
445	8/14	U.S. planes at Dutch airbase.

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†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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